Interrogating personhood and dementia
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
OBJECTIVES: To interrogate the concept of personhood and its application to care practices for people with dementia. METHOD: We outline the work of Tom Kitwood on personhood and relate this to conceptualisations of personhood in metaphysics and in moral philosophy. RESULTS: The philosophical concept of personhood has a long history. The metaphysical tradition examines the necessary and sufficient qualities that make up personhood such as agency, consciousness, identity, rationality and second-order reflexivity. Alternative viewpoints treat personhood as a matter of degree rather than as a superordinate category. Within moral philosophy personhood is treated as a moral status applicable to some or to all human beings. CONCLUSION: In the light of the multiple meanings attached to the term in both metaphysics and moral philosophy, personhood is a relatively unhelpful concept to act as the foundation for developing models and standards of care for people with dementia. Care, we suggest, should concentrate less on ambiguous and somewhat abstract terms such as personhood and focus instead on supporting people's existing capabilities, while minimising the harmful consequences of their incapacities.
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Citations
Cites
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Frankfurt, H. G. (1971) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024717 · Cited by 4,663
Social Cognitive Neuroscience: A Review of Core Processes
Lieberman, M. D. (2007) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085654 · Cited by 2,010
Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right
Hegel, G. W. F. (1991) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808012 · Cited by 1,801
Towards a Theory of Dementia Care: Personhood and Well-being
Kitwood, T., & Bredin, K. (1992) · Ageing and Society · doi:10.1017/s0144686x0000502x · Cited by 1,129 · cited 5×
“…(a) personhood was not so much given as ‘acquired’ as a result of relationships with others, presaged upon that between infant and mother/caregiver (Kitwood & Bredin, 1992, p. 276) and (b) that being or becoming a person gives an individual moral status, making him or her worthy of moral…”
BackgroundInfluentialClassifying neurocognitive disorders: the DSM-5 approach
Sachdev, P. S., Blacker, D., Blazer, D. G., Ganguli, M., Jeste, D. V., Paulsen, J. S., & Petersen, R. C. (2014) · Nature Reviews Neurology · doi:10.1038/nrneurol.2014.181 · Cited by 1,116 · cited 1×
“At the same time, the term itself has been subject to criticism leading the American Psychiatric Association to replace it with the phrase ‘major neurocognitive disorder’ in its latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5; Sachdev et al., 2014).”
BackgroundAging without agency: Theorizing the fourth age
Gilleard, C., & Higgs, P. (2010) · Aging & Mental Health · doi:10.1080/13607860903228762 · Cited by 430
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Cited by
Cooper, C., Marston, L., Barber, J., Livingston, D., Rapaport, P., Higgs, P., & Livingston, G. (2018) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0193399 · Cited by 104
Self-citationHennelly, N., Cooney, A., Houghton, C., & O’Shea, E. (2021) · The Gerontologist · doi:10.1093/geront/gnz159 · Cited by 61
Walsh, S., O'Shea, E., Pierse, T., Kennelly, B., Keogh, F., & Doherty, E. (2020) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2019.112675 · Cited by 47
Metadata
- Authors
- Higgs, P., & Gilleard, C.
- Venue
- Aging & Mental Health
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2015-12-28
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 773-780
- ISSN
- 1360-7863 (ISSN-L)
- 1364-6915
- OpenAlex
- W2200183940
- Cited by
- 77
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 4.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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