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How persuasive are political cheapfakes disseminated via social media? The effects of out-of-context visual disinformation on message credibility and issue agreement

Open access
Hameleers, Michael, van der Meer, Toni, Vliegenthart, Rens · 2025 · Information, Communication & Society

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 17 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Although extant research offered first insights into the effects of visual disinformation, we know markedly little about the effects of cheapfakes that rely on the deceptive re-contextualization of authentic visual materials disseminated via social media. Against this backdrop, we rely on online experiments (N = 874) and (N = 733) in which we exposed representative samples of participants to different types of (visual) disinformation in which the out-of-context presentation of visual material was central. Our findings indicate that cheapfakes based on video editing are not more credible than textual or image-only visual disinformation, while disinformation in general can lower support for a delegitimized politician. As a key contribution, we show that when cheapfakes are endorsed by other online users, they can mislead people and therewith succeed in delegitimizing targeted political actors, although richer modalities used in cheapfakes do not amplify deceptive content’s impact.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This survey experiment with Dutch participants found that out-of-context visual disinformation (cheapfakes) was not more credible or persuasive than text-only disinformation, though disinformation overall was less credible than authentic information. Social endorsement amplified effects mainly among people whose prior anti-immigration attitudes aligned with the deceptive message.

Key findings

  • Disinformation was rated significantly less credible than authentic information (M = 3.65, SD = 1.16 vs. M = 4.88, SD = .93; t(872) = 10.69, p < .001), while issue agreement was similar across disinformation and authentic information (M = 4.25, SD = 1.84 vs. M = 4.31, SD = 1.89; t(872) = .37, p = .716). Candidate evaluations were slightly lower after disinformation (M = 4.45, SD = 1.11) than authentic information (M = 4.64, SD = 1.03; t(872) = 2.18, p = .030; regression B = −.26, SE = .11, p = .014).
  • H1 was not supported: textual, image-plus-text, and cheapfake disinformation did not differ significantly in perceived credibility (all pairwise p = 1.00). However, the cheapfake was perceived as more directly reflecting reality (M = 4.56, SD = 2.10) than textual disinformation (M = 4.01, SD = 1.96, p = .034).
  • Attitudinal congruence moderated effects: disinformation exposure interacted positively with prior issue attitudes on message credibility (H2a supported) and on positive evaluations of the depicted politician (H2c supported), but not on issue agreement (H2b not supported; prior issue attitudes strongly predicted agreement, B = 1.04, SE = .02, β = .89, p < .001).
  • Endorsed disinformation had stronger effects for participants with congruent prior beliefs on credibility and issue agreement (H3a partially supported), but not on source evaluations; discrediting cues showed no significant interaction effects (H3b not supported). In a robustness check on MH370 re-contextualized footage, the cheapfake (M = 3.49, SD = 1.39) was equally credible as textual disinformation (M = 3.36, SD = 1.27), while real footage (M = 3.71, SD = 1.12) was slightly more credible than textual disinformation (ΔM = .35, SE = .11, p = .006).

Methods

  • A survey-embedded online experiment used a 3 (disinformation type: textual vs. text-plus-image vs. cheapfake) × 3 (social endorsement: absent vs. endorsed vs. discredited) + 3 control conditions (authentic textual, text-plus-image, video speech) between-subjects design. Participants were 874 Dutch adults recruited via Kantar in the first week of December 2020 (from 1,267 responses; 69.0% completed); age M = 51.30, SD = 16.84, 49.0% female.
  • The main topic was immigration, using an authentic speech by former Dutch politician Sybrand Buma altered to express radical right-wing anti-immigration claims. A second data collection served as a robustness check on re-contextualized footage about flight MH370 (authentic footage n = 250; textual disinformation n = 254; cheapfake n = 229).
  • Analyses included independent-samples t-tests, one-way ANOVA with Bonferroni-corrected comparisons, and OLS regression models with interaction terms for attitudinal congruence and social endorsement. The study was not officially pre-registered.

Limitations

  • Stated: the text, image, and video stimuli differed on cues that are hard to isolate (e.g., speech, moving images, background), and the study focused on a single right-wing issue in a single country, limiting transferability.
  • Stated: the design used a single disinformation treatment; future research should expose participants to multiple manipulated messages and vary content plausibility.
  • Evident from the text: the achieved sample (874) fell short of the pre-study power estimate of around 900 completes and the target of 1,000, and the authors note that a larger sample would be preferred for testing moderators.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1080/1369118x.2024.2388079

Cites

38 of 38 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Figures

Image 1
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 2
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 3
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 4
CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 1 Mean scores depicting the difference between exposure to authentic information and dis­ information on all three dependent variables
Figure 1 Mean scores depicting the difference between exposure to authentic information and dis­ information on all three dependent variablesCC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 2 Mean scores depicting the difference between exposure to different modalities of (dis)in­ formation for all three dependent variables.
Figure 2 Mean scores depicting the difference between exposure to different modalities of (dis)in­ formation for all three dependent variables.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 3 Interaction effects between prior issue position and disinformation exposure on all three dependent variables.
Figure 3 Interaction effects between prior issue position and disinformation exposure on all three dependent variables.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 4 Interaction effect between prior issue positions and endorsement of disinformation on all three dependent variables.
Figure 4 Interaction effect between prior issue positions and endorsement of disinformation on all three dependent variables.CC-BY · From the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

3 Valid · 2 Not valid · 12 Not checked · 28 Own results and interpretations

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 18
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 11

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Statistics recomputed

Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.

  • Not confirmedt(872) = 0.37reported p = .716 · recomputed p = .711

    “t (872) = .37, p = .716”

  • Consistentt(872) = 10.69reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “t (872) = 10.69, p < .001”

  • Consistentt(872) = 2.18reported p = .03 · recomputed p = .030

    “t (872) = 2.18, p = .030”

  • ConsistentF(3, 870) = 38.21reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (3, 870) = 38.21, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(2, 730) = 4.97reported p = .007 · recomputed p = .007

    “F (2, 730) = 4.97, p = .007”

5 of 5

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

1 of 1

Citations

Cites

Show all 38 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Barari, S., Lucas, C., & Munger, K. (2021). Political deepfake videos misinform the public, but no more than other fake media. OSF Preprints, 13, 1–16.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Hameleers, M., van der Meer, T., & Vliegenthart, R.
Affiliations
  • University of Amsterdam (NL)
  • Wageningen University & Research (NL)
Corresponding author
Hameleers, Michael
Venue
Information, Communication & Society
Published
2024-08-14
Volume
28
Issue
1
Pages
61-78
ISSN
  • 1369-118X (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-4462
OpenAlex
W4401585291
Cited by
22
References
36
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 7
FWCI
9.98
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Information Communication & Society (publishedVersion, public-domain)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Socio-Environmental Systems Modeling (submittedVersion, public-domain)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
Keywords
message credibility, video editing, persuasiveness, social media

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How persuasive are political cheapfakes disseminated via social media? The effects of out-of-context visual disinformation on message credibility and issue agreement. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/1369118x.2024.2388079
The paper
Hameleers, M., van der Meer, T., & Vliegenthart, R. (2025). How persuasive are political cheapfakes disseminated via social media? The effects of out-of-context visual disinformation on message credibility and issue agreement. Information, Communication & Society. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118x.2024.2388079

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.