The Conscious Id
The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Two aspects of the body are represented in the brain, and they are represented differently. The most important difference is that the brain regions for the two aspects of the body are associated with different aspects of consciousness. Very broadly speaking, the brainstem mechanisms derived from the autonomic body are associated with affective consciousness, and the cortical mechanisms derived from the sensorimotor body are associated with cognitive consciousness. Moreover, the upper brainstem is intrinsically conscious whereas the cortex is not; it derives its consciousness from the brainstem. These facts have substantial implications for psychoanalytic metapsychology because the upper brainstem (and associated limbic structures) performs the functions that Freud attributed to the id, while the cortex (and associated forebrain structures) performs the functions he attributed to the ego. This means that the id is the fount of consciousness and the ego is unconscious in itself. The basis for these conclusions, and some of their implications, are discussed here in a preliminary fashion.
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“If core brainstem consciousness is the primary type, then consciousness is fundamentally affective (see Panksepp, 1998; Solms, 2013; Damasio, 2018).”
From The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle (2019) · cites this paper as Solms, 2013
Citations
Cites
James, W. (1913) · Henry Holt and Company eBooks · doi:10.1037/11059-000 · Cited by 25,226
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 9×
“The history of the future of the Bayesian brain.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialHow do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness
(Bud) Craig, A. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2555 · Cited by 6,657 · cited 4×
“Although this formulation derives from Damasio’s conception of The Feeling of What Happens (1999b), it also invokes Freud’s (1895) earlier notion that the forebrain is a “sympathetic ganglion”— that is, that perceptual learning only exists because it serves vital (survival and reproductive) needs.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6553 · Cited by 5,998
Freud, S. (1913) · MacMillan Co eBooks · doi:10.1037/10561-000 · Cited by 5,920
Action recognition in the premotor cortex
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/119.2.593 · Cited by 4,968
Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions
Panksepp, J. (1998) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195096736.001.0001 · Cited by 4,428
Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35784 · Cited by 4,410 · cited 1×
“The well-known “rubber hand illusion” (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), which Tsakiris (2011) described in Berlin, demonstrates the same relation between the self and the external body, albeit less dramatically.”
MethodBrain stem reticular formation and activation of the EEG
Moruzzi, G., & Magoun, H. W. (1949) · Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology · doi:10.1016/0013-4694(49)90219-9 · Cited by 4,307 · cited 1×
“A mere decade after the death of Freud, Moruzzi and Magoun (1949) first demonstrated that consciousness, as measured by EEG activation, is generated in a part of the upper brainstem then called the “reticular activating system.””
BackgroundEPILEPSY AND THE FUNCTIONAL ANATOMY OF THE HUMAN BRAIN
Penfield, W., & Jasper, H. (1954) · Southern Medical Journal · doi:10.1097/00007611-195407000-00024 · Cited by 4,092
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- Freud S., 1896, Standard Edition, 1, 388
- Freud S., 1911, Standard Edition, 12, 215
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Cited by
Lane, R. D., Ryan, L., Nadel, L., & Greenberg, L. (2015) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x14000041 · Cited by 552
Mentalizing homeostasis: the social origins of interoceptive inference
Fotopoulou, A., & Tsakiris, M. (2017) · Neuropsychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/15294145.2017.1294031 · Cited by 428
The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle
Solms, M. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02714 · Cited by 239
“If core brainstem consciousness is the primary type, then consciousness is fundamentally affective (see Panksepp, 1998; Solms, 2013; Damasio, 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe Neurobiological Underpinnings of Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy
Solms, M. L. (2018) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2018.00294 · Cited by 163
“…to suggest that drives, which Freud (1905) located at “the frontier between the mental and the somatic” become mental when they are felt , prior to which they are not drives but rather autonomic regulatory mechanisms (for summaries of this evidence, see Panksepp, 1998; Solms, 2013; Damasio, 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citation(2018) · UCL Discovery (University College London) · Cited by 145
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Solms, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Cape Town (ZA)
- Corresponding author
- Solms, Mark
- ORCID
- Solms, Mark
- Venue
- Neuropsychoanalysis
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2013-01
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-19
- ISSN
- 1529-4145 (ISSN-L)
- 2044-3978
- OpenAlex
- W2012176474
- Cited by
- 284
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 46 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 18.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Neuropsychoanalysis (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Psychoanalysis and Psychopathology Research
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- id, ego, affective consciousness, cognitive consciousness, brainstem, cortex, limbic system, Sigmund Freud, psychoanalytic metapsychology, loss of consciousness
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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