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Cited by 428Embodied and Extended CognitionAction Observation and SynchronizationPhenomenology and Existential Philosophy

Mentalizing homeostasis: the social origins of interoceptive inference

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Fotopoulou, Aikaterini, Tsakiris, Manos·2017·Neuropsychoanalysis
DOI 10.1080/15294145.2017.1294031
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Abstract

Is the self already relational in its very bodily foundations? The question of whether our mental life is initially and primarily shaped by embodied dimensions of the individual or by interpersonal relations is debated in many fields, including psychology, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and more recently, cognitive neuroscience. In this interdisciplinary target article, we put forward the radical claim that even some of the most minimal aspects of selfhood, namely the feeling qualities associated with being an embodied subject, are fundamentally shaped by embodied interactions with other people in early infancy and beyond. Such embodied interactions allow the developing organism to mentalize its homeostatic regulation. In other words, embodied interactions contribute directly to the building of mental models of the infant’s physiological states, given the need to maintain such states within a given dynamic range despite internal or external perturbations. Specifically, our position rests on the following three propositions: (1) the progressive integration and organization of sensory and motor signals constitutes the foundations of the minimal self, a process which we have linked to contemporary, computational models of brain function and named “embodied mentalization”; (2) interactions with other people are motivated and constrained by the same principles that govern the “mentalization” of sensorimotor signals in the individual – and hence the mentalization of one’s body can include signals from other bodies in physical proximity and interaction, especially in interaction with particular bodies. (3) Crucially, given the dependency of humans in early infancy, there is a “homeostatically necessary” plethora of such embodied “proximal” interactions, especially as regards interoception. Collectively, such experiences of proximal intercorporeality “sculpt” the mentalization process and hence the constitution of the minimal self, including the progressive sophistication of mental distinctions between “subject-object,” “self-other” and even “pleasure-pain.” Finally, we explore notions of cardiac and more broadly interoceptive awareness as later, cognitive acquisitions that allow us to progressively solidify such distinctions, as well as understand and empathise with other people.

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  • Affective inference can be understood as an inference about allostatic control, manifesting computationally as precision on the action model that guides domain general policy selection and is closely related to interoceptive and emotional inference.

    “‘Affectivity’ extends this picture to argue that affective inference can similarly be understood as an inference about allostatic control, manifesting computationally as precision on the action model that guides domain general policy selection and is closely related to interoceptive and emotional inference (Seth and Friston 2016; Fotopoulou and Tsakiris 2017; Smith et al. 2019).”

    From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Fotopoulou and Tsakiris 2017

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Authors
Fotopoulou, A., & Tsakiris, M.
Affiliations
  • University College London (GB)
  • ,
Corresponding author
Fotopoulou, Aikaterini
ORCID
Fotopoulou, Aikaterini
Venue
Neuropsychoanalysis
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Published
2017-01-02
Volume
19
Issue
1
Pages
3-28
ISSN
  • 1529-4145 (ISSN-L)
  • 2044-3978
DOI
10.1080/15294145.2017.1294031
OpenAlex
W2601234273
Cited by
428
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 28 · 2025: 52 · 2024: 51 · 2023: 49 · 2022: 52 · 2021: 93 · 2020: 41 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 16
FWCI
16.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Neuropsychoanalysis (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • European Research Council Starting Investigator Award (ERC-2012-STG GA313755)
  • Economic and Social Research Council (ES/K013378/1)
  • Bial Foundation (087/2014)
  • European Research Council (ERC-2010-StG-262853)
  • NOMIS Foundation Distinguished Scientist Award
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Keywords
mentalization, interoception, homeostasis, minimal self, infant development, intercorporeality, sensorimotor integration, self-other distinction, cardiac interoception, empathy, interpersonal relationships

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