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Cited by 15Categorization, perception, and languageSocial and Intergroup PsychologyPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Causal essentialism in kinds

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Ahn, Woo-kyoung, Taylor, Eric G., Kato, Daniel, Marsh, Jessecae K., Bloom, Paul·2013·Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
DOI 10.1080/17470218.2012.730533PMC PMC4119874
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Abstract

The current study examines causal essentialism, derived from psychological essentialism of concepts. We examine whether people believe that members of a category share some underlying essence that is both necessary and sufficient for category membership and that also causes surface features. The main claim is that causal essentialism is restricted to categories that correspond to our intuitive notions of existing kinds and hence is more attenuated for categories that are based on arbitrary criteria. Experiments 1 and 3 found that people overtly endorse causal essences in nonarbitrary kinds but are less likely to do so for arbitrary categories. Experiments 2 and 4 found that people were more willing to generalize a member's known causal relations (or lack thereof) when dealing with a kind than when dealing with an arbitrary category. These differences between kinds and arbitrary categories were found across various domains—not only for categories of living things, but also for artefacts. These findings have certain real-world implications, including how people make sense of mental disorders that are treated as real kinds.

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  • The reflective model is consistent with causal essentialism in kinds because clinicians are more likely to believe that symptoms result from a single cause, that all patients with the disorder have this cause, and that causal relations among symptoms are similar among patients when symptoms are correlated.

    “This model is also consistent with causal essentialism in kinds (Ahn, Taylor, Kato, Marsh, & Bloom, 2013), because clinicians are more likely to believe that symptoms result from a single cause, that all patients with the disorder have this cause, and that the causal relations among symptoms are similar among patients with these disorders if the symptoms are correlated”

    From Toward a Cognitive-Behavioral Classification System for Mental Disorders (2014) · cites this paper as Ahn et al., 2013

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Atran S Estin P Coley JD Medin DL 1997 Generic Species and Basic Levels: Essence and Appearance in Folk Biology Journal of Ethnobiology 17 22 45
  2. Medin DL Ortony A Vosniadou S Ortony A 1989 Psychological essentialism Similarity and analogical reasoning 179 196 Cambridge, MA Cambridge University Press
  3. Putnam H Schwartz SP 1977 Is semantics possible? Naming, necessity, and natural kinds Cornell University Press Ithaca, NY

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Authors
Ahn, W.-K., Taylor, E. G., Kato, D., Marsh, J. K., & Bloom, P.
Affiliations
  • Yale University (US)
  • Columbia University (US)
  • Lehigh University (US)
ORCID
Venue
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
Publisher
SAGE Publications
Published
2013-06
Volume
66
Issue
6
Pages
1113-1130
ISSN
  • 0033-555X (ISSN-L)
  • 1747-0218
  • 1747-0226
DOI
10.1080/17470218.2012.730533
PMC
PMC4119874
OpenAlex
W1991539512
Cited by
15
References
43
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2017: 3 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 1
FWCI
2.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
Locations
  • Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
Funders
National Human Genome Research Institute (R01HG007653)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
psychological essentialism, kinds, category membership, causal relationship, generalization, artifacts, mental illness
MeSH terms
Analysis of Variance, Classification, Concept Formation, Female, Generalization, Psychological, Humans, Male, Models, Psychological, Students, Universities, Causality

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