The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?
Abstract
Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, the article argues that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating or obstructing attempts by the institutions to implement private agendas; and (4) the consequences of previous rounds of delegation affect future delegation, institutional design, and interaction, through positive and negative feed-back loops.
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Cites
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (2004) · Advances in Strategic Management · doi:10.1016/s0742-3322(00)17011-1 · Cited by 25,802
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
Ross, S. A. (1973) · American Economic Review · Cited by 4,269
THE JOINT‐DECISION TRAP: LESSONS FROM GERMAN FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
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Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism
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The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems
Majone, G. (1999) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402389908425284 · Cited by 749
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International cooperation and institutional choice: the European Community's internal market
Garrett, G. (1992) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027806 · Cited by 676
1992: Recasting the European Bargain
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Cited by
Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union
Tallberg, J. (2002) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081802760199908 · Cited by 713
Self-citationDelegation and pooling in international organizations
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2015) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-014-9194-4 · Cited by 469
Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes and the eu regulatory state
Eberlein †, B., & Grande ‡, E. (2005) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/1350176042000311925 · Cited by 421
Interest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose?
Dür, A., Bernhagen, P., & Marshall, D. (2015) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014565890 · Cited by 264
Becker, M. (2019) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.12250 · Cited by 71
Metadata
- Authors
- Tallberg, J.
- Venue
- West European Politics
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23-46
- ISSN
- 0140-2382 (ISSN-L)
- 1743-9655
- OpenAlex
- W1979500150
- Cited by
- 449
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 38.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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