The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation
Abstract
The conventional wisdom in support of central bank independence rests on a series of contestable arguments about the relationship between democracy, policy making, and economic outcomes. Empirical work casts doubt on the severity of the inflationary problems purportedly solved by delegation to independent central banks, as well as raising questions about the linkages between delegation and superior economic outcomes. So why delegate? Theories of institutional isomorphism, or the copying of organisational models, provide an alternative sociological explanation of the diffusion of central bank independence. Drawing on this approach, it is argued that governments choose central bank independence because delegation has important legitimising and symbolic properties that are attractive to political leaders in times of economic uncertainty. Delegation to independent central banks is rational, efficient, and acceptable in a democratic society because of the cultural processes which define it as such, not because of the functional requirements of economic management.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik
FOLLESDAL, A., & HIX, S. (2006) · JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00650.x · Cited by 1,718
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
Pollack, M. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199251177.001.0001 · Cited by 888
The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries
Fourcade‐Gourinchas, M., & Babb, S. L. (2002) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/367922 · Cited by 815
Policy diffusion and policy transfer
Marsh, D., & Sharman, J. C. (2009) · Policy Studies · doi:10.1080/01442870902863851 · Cited by 691
Gilardi, F. (2005) · The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/0002716204271833 · Cited by 431
Metadata
- Authors
- McNamara, K.
- Venue
- West European Politics
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 47-76
- ISSN
- 0140-2382 (ISSN-L)
- 1743-9655
- OpenAlex
- W2109211516
- Cited by
- 501
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 45.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/713601585
- The paper
- McNamara, K. (2002). Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation. West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/713601585
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.