Earnings, Productivity, and Performance‐Related Pay
The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
Jobs with performance‐related pay (PRP) attract workers of higher ability and induce workers to provide greater effort. We construct an integrated model of effort and sorting that clarifies the distinction between observable and unobservable ability and the relationship between earnings and productivity. Predictions are tested against data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The PRP raises wages by 9% for men and 6% for women. Theoretical calculations show that these estimated earnings differentials represent average productivity differentials net of monitoring costs at the marginal firm using PRP but not of the disutility of additional effort expended by workers.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Gagné, M., & Forest, J. (2008) · Canadian Psychology / Psychologie canadienne · doi:10.1037/a0012757 · Cited by 232
How Does Product Market Competition Shape Incentive Contracts?
Cuñat, V., & Guadalupe, M. (2005) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/1542476054729437 · Cited by 174
“[9] Booth, Alison L.”
BackgroundBiermann, O. C., Ma, N. F., & Yoon, D. (2022) · Designing Interactive Systems Conference · doi:10.1145/3532106.3533506 · Cited by 116
“existing research investigating other domains of work with outputbased compensation which has demonstrated that increased income is a key incentive driving worker productivity [3, 11, 54, 55, 86].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Booth, A. L., & Frank, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1999-07
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 447-463
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W1979245822
- Cited by
- 215
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 13.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.