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Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem
Abstract
Our recent experimental research called into question the predictive utility of the free-rider hypothesis regarding the provision of public goods by groups. However, several critical questions regarding the generality of the findings may be raised. This paper reports three systematic replications of the previous research which deal with the most pressing of these questions. Study I shows that the presence of a "provision point" in the payoff structure does not substantially affect the results. Study II indicates that a fivefold increase in the amount of money at stake in the relevant decision does affect behavior but not sufficiently to salvage a strong version of the free-rider hypothesis. Study III shows that experienced subjects do not behave very differently from inexperienced ones in this situation.
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Citations
Cites
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Sufrin, S. C., & Olson, M. (1966) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2521228 · Cited by 11,518
Cited by
Collective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
Остром, Э. (2010) · Public Administration Issues · doi:10.17323/1999-5431-2010-0-1-5-52 · Cited by 2,850
Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements
Jenkins, J. C. (1983) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.so.09.080183.002523 · Cited by 1,867
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
Chaudhuri, A. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1 · Cited by 1,445
Contemporary Guidance for Stated Preference Studies
Johnston, R. J., Boyle, K. J., Adamowicz, W. (., Bennett, J., Brouwer, R., Cameron, T. A., Hanemann, W. M., Hanley, N., Ryan, M., Scarpa, R., et al. (2017) · Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists · doi:10.1086/691697 · Cited by 1,430
Metadata
- Authors
- Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E.
- Venue
- American Journal of Sociology
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1980-01
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 926-937
- ISSN
- 0002-9602 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5390
- OpenAlex
- W2005264387
- Cited by
- 277
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 36.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1980). Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem. American Journal of Sociology. https://doi.org/10.1086/227094
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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