Cited by 1,445Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationGame Theory and Voting Systems

Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature

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Chaudhuri, Ananish·2011·Experimental Economics

Abstract

I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching.

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Crossref · 10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1

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  • The search for mechanisms that encourage sustainable reciprocation in this class of common pool resource (CPR) problem has been a central concern in the social sciences.

    “The search for mechanisms that encourage sustainable reciprocation in this class of common pool resource (CPR) problem has been a central concern in the social sciences10,11.”
  • Cooperation levels are significantly higher when punishment of free-riders is possible compared to when it is not.

    “Our results suggest that, while cooperation levels are significantly higher when punishment of free-riders is possible compared to when it is not—a result that has been established multiple times in the literature (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Falk et al., 2005; Chaudhuri, 2011)—OT also shows a positive effect on cooperation, irrespective of the availability of a sanctioning mechanism.”

    From Oxytocin promotes altruistic punishment (2017) · cites this paper as Chaudhuri, 2011

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Authors
Chaudhuri, A.
Affiliations
University of Auckland (NZ)
Corresponding author
Chaudhuri, Ananish
Venue
Experimental Economics
Published
2011-03
Volume
14
Issue
1
Pages
47-83
ISSN
  • 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-6938
OpenAlex
W2003089824
Cited by
1,445
References
172
Citations by year
2026: 57 · 2025: 82 · 2024: 103 · 2023: 74 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 122 · 2020: 120 · 2019: 120 · 2018: 116 · 2017: 102 · 2016: 107 · 2015: 98 · 2014: 84 · 2013: 64 · 2012: 56
FWCI
130.93
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Experimental Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • ResearchSpace (University of Auckland) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
public goods, cooperation, conditional cooperation, costly punishment, free-riding, assortative matching, advice-giving, disapproval, voluntary contributions

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