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Collective Sanctions and the Creation of Prisoner's Dilemma Norms
Abstract
Social psychologists, sociologists, and economists have all proposed theories of norm emergence. In general, they views norm emergence as depending on three factors: (i) actors' preferences regarding their own behavior (inclinations); (ii) actors' preferences regarding the behavior of others (regulatory interests); and (iii) measures for enforcing norms (enforcement resources), such as access to sanctions and information. Whereas most studies of norm emergence have focused on inclinations or enforcement resources, this article analyzes the role of regulatory interests in norm emergence. Specifically, it analyzes systems of collective sanctions in which, when and individual violates or complies with a rule, not merely the individual but other memgers of that person's group as well are collectively punished of rewarded by an external agent. These collective sanctions give individuals an incentive to regulate one another's behavior. This paper demonstrates that when a group is subjected to collective sanctions, a variety of responses may be rational: the group may either create a secondary sanctioning system to enforce the agent's dictates, or it may revolt against the agent to destroy its sanctioning capacity. According to the proposed theoretic model. the optimal response depends quite sensitively on the group's size, internal cohesion, and related factors.
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Citations
Cites
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.
Yamagishi, T. (1986) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110 · Cited by 1,359
Cited by
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Kollock, P. (1998) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · Cited by 1,746
The sociobiology of sociopathy: An integrated evolutionary model
Mealey, L. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00039595 · Cited by 984
Sociological Rational Choice Theory
Hechter, M., & Kanazawa, S. (1997) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.191 · Cited by 450
Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem
HECKATHORN, D. D. (1989) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463189001001006 · Cited by 392
Self-citationFirm‐Wide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airlines
Knez, M., & Simester, D. (2001) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/322820 · Cited by 376
Metadata
- Authors
- Heckathorn, D. D.
- Venue
- American Journal of Sociology
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1988-11
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 535-562
- ISSN
- 0002-9602 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5390
- OpenAlex
- W2032864489
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 15.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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