The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem
Abstract
This article examines the relationship between the first- and second-order free-rider problems in collective sanction systems, with special emphasis on the relative robustness of cooperation in the first and second levels. The results indicate that second-order cooperation exhibits surprising robustness relative to first-order cooperation. The implication is that hypocrisy, though universally maligned, may play a crucial transitional role both in the emergence of collective action and in the continuity of collective action under adverse circumstances.
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Cites
An Evolutionary Approach to Norms
Axelrod, R. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400185016 · Cited by 2,205
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Perrow, C. B., & Olson, M. (1973) · Social Forces · doi:10.2307/2576430 · Cited by 2,137
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.
Yamagishi, T. (1986) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110 · Cited by 1,359
Oliver, P., Marwell, G., & Teixeira, R. (1985) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/228313 · Cited by 968
The Economic Theory of Social Institutions.
Slater, J. R., & Schotter, A. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232564 · Cited by 824
The Paradox of Group Size in Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. II.
Oliver, P. E., & Marwell, G. (1988) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2095728 · Cited by 554
Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations
Oliver, P. (1980) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/227168 · Cited by 551
Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma
Hardin, R. (1971) · Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830160507 · Cited by 370
Community, Anarchy, and Liberty.
Weston, A., & Taylor, M. (1985) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026398 · Cited by 362
Juvenile Delinquency and Subterranean Values
Matza, D., & Sykes, G. M. (1961) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2090200 · Cited by 327
Cited by
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation
Kollock, P. (1998) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · Cited by 1,746
Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology
Hedstrom, P. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511488801 · Cited by 816
(2005) · Cited by 772
Local Enforcement and Better Forests
Gibson, C. C., Williams, J. T., & Ostrom, E. (2005) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.07.013 · Cited by 593
Metadata
- Authors
- HECKATHORN, D. D.
- Venue
- Rationality and Society
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1989-07
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 78-100
- ISSN
- 1043-4631 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7358
- OpenAlex
- W2034486410
- Cited by
- 392
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 16.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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