The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth
Open accessAbstract
There Appears to be significant diversity in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption across countries at different stages of economic development and under different political and economic regimes. Little theoretical or empirical analysis has been offered, however, on the link between corruption, government, and growth. The paper attempts to fill the void through equilibrium models of endogenous growth. “balanced growth” is derived as a balancing act between accumulating human capital, which engenders growth, and accumulating political capital, which mainly assures bureaucratic power. The analysis focuses on the interplay between investment in these two types of capital and its implications for long‐term growth under alternative political regimes. Some propositions are tested and confirmed empirically.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
On the mechanics of economic development
Lucas, R. E. (1988) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(88)90168-7 · Cited by 24,085
(2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.i · Cited by 15,100
Mauro, P. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946696 · Cited by 8,820
Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogeneous Growth
Barro, R. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261726 · Cited by 6,340
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society
Krueger, A. O. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_8 · Cited by 5,272
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118402 · Cited by 3,778
The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988
Summers, R., & Heston, A. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937941 · Cited by 3,429
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption
Leff, N. H. (1964) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/000276426400800303 · Cited by 2,568
The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937945 · Cited by 2,092
Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic Growth
Becker, G. S., Murphy, K. M., & Tamura, R. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261723 · Cited by 1,988
An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery
Lui, F. T. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261329 · Cited by 1,304
Self-citationCrime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses
Ehrlich, I. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.1.43 · Cited by 714
Self-citationIntergenerational Trade, Longevity, and Economic Growth
Ehrlich, I., & Lui, F. T. (1991) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261788 · Cited by 578
Self-citationThe Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1990) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3530 · Cited by 432
Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic Growth
Becker, G., Murphy, K., & Tamura, R. (1990) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3414 · Cited by 297
Cited by
Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?
Méon, P.-G., & Weill, L. (2010) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.06.004 · Cited by 894
Culture rules: The foundations of the rule of law and other norms of governance
Licht, A. N., Goldschmidt, C., & Schwartz, S. H. (2007) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2007.09.001 · Cited by 858
Glaeser, E. L., & Saks, R. E. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.007 · Cited by 788
Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa
Gyimah-Brempong, K. (2002) · Economics of Governance · doi:10.1007/s101010200045 · Cited by 660
Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment
Egger, P., & Winner, H. (2005) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 614
Metadata
- Authors
- Ehrlich, I., & Lui, F. T.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1999-12
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- S6
- Pages
- S270-S293
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W3125784551
- Cited by
- 593
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 27.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.