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An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery
Abstract
It is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes. This hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue's server. The Nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are de- rived. It is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed. The model does not have strin- gent informational requirements, and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue. It also suggests a useful auctioning procedure.
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Citations
Cited by
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CULL, R., & XU, L. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.010 · Cited by 1,023
Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?
Méon, P.-G., & Weill, L. (2010) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.06.004 · Cited by 894
Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition
Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2444 · Cited by 759
Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry
Dreher, A., & Gassebner, M. (2013) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9871-2 · Cited by 746
Metadata
- Authors
- Lui, F. T.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1985-08
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 760-781
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2057811978
- Cited by
- 1,304
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 9.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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