The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance
Abstract
American families are in general overinsured against health expenses. If insurance coverage were reduced, the utility loss from increased risk would be more than outweighted by the gain due to lower prices and the reduced purchase of excess care. The first part of the paper develops and estimates a structural equation for the demand for health care and then examines the dynamic interaction between the purchase of insurance and the demand and supply for health care. The second part estimates the welfare gains that would result from decreasing insurance by raising the average coinsurance rate from 0.33 to 0.50 and 0.67 percent. The most likely values imply net gains in excess of $4 billion.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
Pratt, J. W. (1976) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912743 · Cited by 4,654
UNCERTAINTY AND THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE
Arrow, K. J. (2003) · Uncertain Times · doi:10.2307/j.ctv11sn34h.6 · Cited by 4,078
The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing
Arrow, K. J. (1973) · Readings in Welfare Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15492-0_19 · Cited by 1,179
Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection
Ehrlich, I., & Becker, G. S. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_8 · Cited by 1,060
Balestra, P., & Nerlove, M. (1966) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1909771 · Cited by 1,005
Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing
Mossin, J. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_5 · Cited by 609
Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives
Zeckhauser, R. (1970) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(70)90010-4 · Cited by 595
Newhouse, J. P., & Taylor, V. (1969) · Cited by 583
Dubos, R. J. (1959) · Cited by 295
Borch, K. H. (1968) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 282
Cited by
The demand for deductibles in private health insurance
Van de Ven, W. P. M. M., & Van Praag, B. M. S. (1981) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(81)90028-2 · Cited by 1,367
(1994) · PubMed · Cited by 1,008
WHAT GOOD IS WEALTH WITHOUT HEALTH? THE EFFECT OF HEALTH ON THE MARGINAL UTILITY OF CONSUMPTION
Finkelstein, A., Luttmer, E. F. P., & Notowidigdo, M. J. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01101.x · Cited by 568
Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise
Rich, A. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511509889 · Cited by 499
Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect Medical Treatment and Patient Health?
Clemens, J., & Gottlieb, J. D. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.4.1320 · Cited by 485
A Microeconometric Model of the Demand for Health Care and Health Insurance in Australia
Cameron, A. C., Trivedi, P. K., Milne, F., & Piggott, J. (1988) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297531 · Cited by 481
Can insurance increase financial risk?
Wagstaff, A., & Lindelow, M. (2008) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.02.002 · Cited by 447
Technology Growth and Expenditure Growth in Health Care
Chandra, A., & Skinner, J. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.3.645 · Cited by 412
Chapter 8 Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care
Zweifel, P., & Manning, W. G. (2000) · Handbook of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0064(00)80167-5 · Cited by 389
Think tanks, public policy, and the politics of expertise
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-1236 · Cited by 310
The value of health insurance: the access motive
Nyman, J. A. (1999) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/s0167-6296(98)00049-6 · Cited by 294
Behavioral Hazard in Health Insurance *
Baicker, K., Mullainathan, S., & Schwartzstein, J. (2015) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjv029 · Cited by 247
Krieger, M., & Felder, S. (2013) · International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · doi:10.3390/ijerph10062560 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Feldstein, M. S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1973-03
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 2, Part 1
- Pages
- 251-280
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2105056830
- Cited by
- 506
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 12.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.