The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria
Abstract
This paper studies an industry with demand uncertainty which prompts risk-neutral firms to act both as employers and as insurers of homogeneous, risk-averse laborers. The resulting contractual arrangements turn out, in their simplest form, to be more likely to specify full employment the more of the following conditions prevail: small variability in product price, above-average economy-wide labor demand, highly risk-averse workers, small unemployment compensation, and highly competitive product market. Otherwise, it may be optimal for firms to lay off, by random choice, part of the work force during low states of demand.
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Citations
Cites
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Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping
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Cited by
Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
Akerlof, G. A. (1982) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885099 · Cited by 3,210
Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (2000) · Choices, Values, and Frames · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803475.019 · Cited by 3,158
Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover
Jovanovic, B. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260808 · Cited by 3,092
Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule
Fischer, S. (1977) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260551 · Cited by 1,943
A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
Akerlof, G. A. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885667 · Cited by 1,648
Metadata
- Authors
- Azariadis, C.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1975-12
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1183-1202
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2074308844
- Cited by
- 1,262
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 76.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.