A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
Abstract
This paper examines adherence to social customs. Models of social customs are found to be inherently multi-equilibrial. It is found that social customs which are disadvantageous to the individual may nevertheless persist without erosion, if individuals are sanctioned by loss of reputation for disobedience of the custom. One example of such a social custom is the persistence of a fair (rather than a market-clearing) wage. In this fashion, involuntary unemployment is explained.
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Many gifts signal things by convention or custom, and conventional gifts are often inefficient.
“Many gifts signal things by convention (Lewis 1969) or custom (Akerlof 1980), and these conventional gifts are often inefficient.”
From Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols (1988) · cites this paper as Akerlof 1980
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- Authors
- Akerlof, G. A.
- Affiliations
- London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Akerlof, George A.
- ORCID
- Akerlof, George A.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1980-06
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 749
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2200113965
- Cited by
- 1,648
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 31 · 2025: 72 · 2024: 50 · 2023: 36 · 2022: 45 · 2021: 53 · 2020: 48 · 2019: 51 · 2018: 48 · 2017: 48 · 2016: 46 · 2015: 49 · 2014: 55 · 2013: 52 · 2012: 63
- FWCI
- 23.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic theories and models
- Keywords
- social customs, reputation, sanctions, involuntary unemployment, fair wages, earnings persistence, social norms
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