The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking
Abstract
Recent work on the theory of the firm under regulation suggests that managers of regulated firms may be utility maximizers rather than profit maximizers. There is, however, very little empirical evidence on managerial behavior in regulated industries. This article examines one kind of utility-maximizing behavior that seems particularly applicable to regulated firms: expense-preference behavior. Specifically, I develop a test capable of discriminating between expense-preference and profit-maximizing behavior and apply it to the banking industry, a highly regulated industry. My findings indicate that an expense-preference theoretical framework better explains the behavior of regulated firms than does a profit-maximization framework.
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Citations
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Self-citationMeasuring the Effectiveness of Regulation: The Case of Bank Entry Regulation
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Self-citation
Cited by
Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376950 · Cited by 3,777
Melville, N., Kraemer, K., & Gurbaxani, V. (2004) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/25148636 · Cited by 3,372
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Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1978) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf03187594 · Cited by 1,160
Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?
Giroud, X., & Mueller, H. M. (2010) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.10.008 · Cited by 1,037
Altunbas, Y., Evans, L., & Molyneux, P. (2001) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/2673929 · Cited by 624
Metadata
- Authors
- Edwards, F. R.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1977-02
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 147-162
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2016535328
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 12.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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