The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Subjective Information and Market Efficiency in a Betting Market
Abstract
Much of the information available to participants in speculative markets is in the nature of expert opinion, analysis, professional advice, and so on. Markets discount widely held factual information very well; this paper studies market efficiency with respect to subjective information. We examine the "market" for bets on thoroughbred horse races to determine whether the published forecasts of professional handicappers are completely discounted. A multinomial logit probability model is used to measure the information content of the forecasts, and we find that they do contain considerable information but that the track odds generated by betting discount almost all of it. Within the population of bettors, those betting at the track appear to discount the handicapper information fully, but those betting through New York's off-track betting system do not.
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Citations
Cited by
Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets
De Long, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H., & Waldmann, R. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261703 · Cited by 6,234
Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation
DE LONG, J. B., SHLEIFER, A., SUMMERS, L. H., & WALDMANN, R. J. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03695.x · Cited by 2,192
Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance
Shleifer, A. (2000) · doi:10.1093/0198292279.001.0001 · Cited by 1,236
A Comparative Literature Survey of Islamic Finance and Banking
Zaher, T. S., & Kabir Hassan, M. (2001) · Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments · doi:10.1111/1468-0416.00044 · Cited by 482
Combinatorial Information Market Design
Hanson, R. (2003) · Information Systems Frontiers · doi:10.1023/a:1022058209073 · Cited by 479
Bettors Love Skewness, Not Risk, at the Horse Track
Golec, J., & Tamarkin, M. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250007 · Cited by 398
Estimation of Agent-Based Models: The Case of an Asymmetric Herding Model
Alfarano, S., Lux, T., & Wagner, F. (2005) · Computational Economics · doi:10.1007/s10614-005-6415-1 · Cited by 350
Information and efficiency: an empirical study of a fixed odds betting market
Kuypers, T. (2000) · Applied Economics · doi:10.1080/00036840050151449 · Cited by 172
Beating the Spread: Testing the Efficiency of the Gambling Market for National Football League Games
Zuber, R. A., Gandar, J. M., & Bowers, B. D. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261332 · Cited by 144
Towards a methodology for measuring the true degree of efficiency in a speculative market
Lessmann, S., Sung, M.-C., & Johnson, J. E. V. (2011) · Journal of the Operational Research Society · doi:10.1057/jors.2010.192 · Cited by 7
“In particular, a subset of these papers has developed insights into financial market efficiency (eg, Snyder, 1978; Figlewski, 1979; Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1997; Sung and Johnson, 2010).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Figlewski, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1979-02
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 75-88
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2085986682
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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