The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market
Abstract
Families can self-insure against uncertain dates of death through implicit or explicit agreements with respect to consumption and interfamily transfers. Interfamily transfers need have nothing to do with altruistic feelings; they may simply reflect risk-sharing behavior of completely selfish family members. Although family annuity markets are incomplete, even small families can substitute by more than 70 percent for perfect market annuities. Given adverse selection and transaction costs, family risk pooling may be preferred to public market annuities. In the absence of public annuities, these risk-sharing arrangements provide powerful incentives for marriage and family formation.
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Pension plans may reduce the incentive for households to self-insure through greater private savings, potentially lowering aggregate private savings.
“By providing a low cost way of obtaining longevity insurance, pension plans may reduce the incentive for households to self-insure through greater private savings.The result could be that the aggregate level of private savings in the economy falls.”
From Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance (1989) · cites this paper as Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981)
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Reciprocity in parent-child relations over the adult life course.
Silverstein, M., Conroy, S. J., Wang, H., Giarrusso, R., & Bengtson, V. L. (2002) · The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences · doi:10.1093/geronb/57.1.s3 · Cited by 460 · see citing works
Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance
Bodie, Z. (1989) · NBER Working Paper · doi:10.3386/w2917 · Cited by 194 · see citing works
Chapter 17 The economics of population aging
Weil, D. N. (1997) · Handbook of Population and Family Economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-003x(97)80009-8 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
- Authors
- Kotlikoff, L. J., & Spivak, A.
- Affiliations
- Boston University (US)
- Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1981-04
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 372-391
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1975378408
- Cited by
- 642
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 24 · 2012: 18
- FWCI
- 32.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
- Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Insurance and Financial Risk Management
- Keywords
- intergenerational transfers, risk sharing, adverse selection, transaction costs, marriage incentives, family formation, incomplete markets
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