The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?
Abstract
The paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is, by itself, sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods. Jurisdictions have fixed boundaries, and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good. Residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions. It is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency. Though residents can "vote with their feet," land is immobile. Hence, governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends. Increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power.
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Citations
Cites
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
Tiebout, C. M. (1956) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257839 · Cited by 13,222
Niskanen, W. A. (1975) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466829 · Cited by 1,022
Cited by
Oates, W. E. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.3.1120 · Cited by 3,376
Income Distribution, Communities, and the Quality of Public Education
Fernandez, R., & Rogerson, R. (1996) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946660 · Cited by 486
Ferreira, F. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.003 · Cited by 148
Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool
Berry, C. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00344.x · Cited by 128
Metadata
- Authors
- Epple, D., & Zelenitz, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1981-12
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1197-1217
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1967966700
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 38.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Epple, D., & Zelenitz, A. (1981). The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics? Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261029
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.