The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?
Abstract
The paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is, by itself, sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods. Jurisdictions have fixed boundaries, and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good. Residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions. It is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency. Though residents can "vote with their feet," land is immobile. Hence, governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends. Increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power.
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Citations
Cites
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
Tiebout, C. M. (1956) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257839 · Cited by 13,222
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Theories of Economic Regulation
Posner, R. (1974) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.3386/w0041 · Cited by 1,481
Oates, W. E. (1969) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259584 · Cited by 1,371
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1978) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf03187594 · Cited by 1,160
Niskanen, W. A. (1975) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466829 · Cited by 1,022
Taxes, Spending, and Property Values: Supply Adjustment in a Tiebout-Oates Model
Edel, M., & Sclar, E. (1974) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260248 · Cited by 213
Testing political economy’s ‘as if’ proposition: is the median income voter really decisive?
Inman, R. P. (1978) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf03187595 · Cited by 212
An Elementary Political and Economic Theory of the Expenditures of Local Governments
Barr, J. L., & Davis, O. A. (1966) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1055384 · Cited by 210
A Search for Testable Implications of the Tiebout Hypothesis
Epple, D. N., Zelenitz, A., & Visscher, M. (1978) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260679 · Cited by 91
Self-citationCompetition, Monopoly, and the Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas
Wagner, R. E., & Weber, W. E. (1975) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466831 · Cited by 81
Cited by
Oates, W. E. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.3.1120 · Cited by 3,376
The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development
Xu, C. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.4.1076 · Cited by 2,623
Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods
Zodrow, G. R., & Mieszkowski, P. (1986) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/0094-1190(86)90048-3 · Cited by 1,668
Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (1997) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.11.4.83 · Cited by 1,495
Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style
Jin, H., Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.11.008 · Cited by 1,172
Metadata
- Authors
- Epple, D., & Zelenitz, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1981-12
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1197-1217
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1967966700
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 38.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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