The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery
Abstract
It is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes. This hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue's server. The Nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are de- rived. It is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed. The model does not have strin- gent informational requirements, and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue. It also suggests a useful auctioning procedure.
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Citations
Cites
A Proof for the Queuing Formula: L = λ W
Little, J. D. C. (1961) · Operations Research · doi:10.1287/opre.9.3.383 · Cited by 2,777
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption
Leff, N. H. (1964) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/000276426400800303 · Cited by 2,568
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Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations
Lau, L. J., & Myrdal, G. (1969) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1227572 · Cited by 1,434
INFORMATION COSTS, PRICING, AND RESOURCE UNEMPLOYMENT
Alchian, A. A. (1969) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1969.tb01469.x · Cited by 282
Holt, C. A., & Sherman, R. (1982) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261056 · Cited by 97
Cited by
Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues
Bardhan, P. (2017) · Political Corruption · doi:10.4324/9781315126647-30 · Cited by 2,616
Tanzi, V. (1998) · Staff Papers · doi:10.2139/ssrn.882334 · Cited by 2,048
Eight Questions about Corruption
Svensson, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005774357860 · Cited by 1,699
Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence
Fisman, R., & Svensson, J. (2007) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.09.009 · Cited by 1,694
Corruption and Economic Growth
Mo, P. H. (2001) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1006/jcec.2000.1703 · Cited by 1,426
Metadata
- Authors
- Lui, F. T.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1985-08
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 760-781
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2057811978
- Cited by
- 1,304
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 9.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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