The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Distinguishing Panics and Information-based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications
Abstract
In this paper we contrast panics and information-based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered. The model of information-based runs is characterized by two-sided asymmetric information: the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality. We also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts. We show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity
HIRSHLEIFER, J. (1978) · Uncertainty in Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-214850-7.50038-3 · Cited by 1,571
A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance
Bryant, J. (1980) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(80)90012-6 · Cited by 1,061
Kennedy, C., Gurley, J. G., Shaw, E. S., & Enthoven, A. C. (1960) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2228813 · Cited by 668
An Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holding Companies
Black, F., Miller, M. H., & Posner, R. A. (1978) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296005 · Cited by 153
On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
Laffont, J. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911721 · Cited by 127
Private information, deposit interest rates, and the ‘stability’ of the banking system
Smith, B. D. (1984) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(84)90045-x · Cited by 121
Aspects of Monetary and Banking Theory and Moral Hazard
Bhattacharya, S. (1982) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03559.x · Cited by 102
Self-citationFutures markets and commodity options: Hedging and optimality in incomplete markets
Breeden, D. T. (1984) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(84)90055-3 · Cited by 90
Cited by
Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking
Diamond, D. W., & Rajan, R. G. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/319552 · Cited by 2,002
The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements
Calomiris, C. W., & Kahn, C. M. (1991) · American Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d8th8x53 · Cited by 1,470
Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank
Freixas, X., Parigi, B. M., & Rochet, J.-C. (2000) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/2601198 · Cited by 1,379
Rational herding in financial economics
Devenow, A., & Welch, I. (1996) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00073-9 · Cited by 1,263
Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs
GOLDSTEIN, I., & PAUZNER, A. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00762.x · Cited by 1,199
Metadata
- Authors
- Jacklin, C. J., & Bhattacharya, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1988-06
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 568-592
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2012296598
- Cited by
- 709
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 15.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.