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Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment

MacLeod, W. Bentley, Malcomson, James M. · 1988 · Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

The employment relationship with employees' ability and their actions both private information (thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard) is modeled as a repeated game with self-enforcing contracts being perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under termination contracts, the equilibrium contract structure consists of a hierarchy of ranks, finite in number even though ability is continuous. Reputation acts as an effective device for worker discipline without the need for involuntary unemployment. Selection by bonding is not, in general, incentive compatible, but selection by promotion of employees through the ranks is. Many other features correspond to observed employment structures.

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Metadata

Authors
MacLeod, W. B., & Malcomson, J. M.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
1988-08
Volume
96
Issue
4
Pages
832-854
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W2143604006
Cited by
198
References
0
FWCI
5.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/261565
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MacLeod, W. B., & Malcomson, J. M. (1988). Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261565

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