The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires
Open accessAbstract
We study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina during 1996-97. We find a well-defined, negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption. Prices paid by hospitals for basic, homogeneous inputs fall by 15% during the first nine months of the crackdown. After this period prices rise, but they are still 10% lower than those prevailing before the crackdown. Relative to the pre-crackdown period, higher wages play no role in inducing lower input prices when audit intensity can be expected to be maximal (during the first phase of the crackdown), but have a negative and well-defined effect when audit intensity takes intermediate levels (the last phase of the crackdown). Controlling for fixed effects, we find that the wage elasticity of input prices exceeds 20%. These results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of Becker and Stigler (1974).
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Di Tella and Schargrodosky (2003) demonstrated that the effect of economic incentives for public officials on corruption is negative and significant only when associated to audits systems.
“For example, the study of Di Tella and Schargrodosky (2003) demonstrated that the effect of economic incentives for public officials on corruption is negative and significant only when associated to audits systems (Di Tella and Schargrodosky 2003).”
From Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review (2021) · cites this paper as Di Tella and Schargrodosky 2003
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Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779 · see citing works
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Lewis-Faupel, S., Neggers, Y., Olken, B. A., & Pande, R. (2016) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20140258 · Cited by 194 · see citing works
A controlled field experiment on corruption
Armantier, O., & Boly, A. (2011) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.04.007 · Cited by 146 · see citing works
Lights on the shadows of public procurement: Transparency as an antidote to corruption
Bauhr, M., Czibik, Á., de Fine Licht, J., & Fazekas, M. (2020) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12432 · Cited by 131 · see citing works
Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review
Mugellini, G., Della Bella, S., Colagrossi, M., Isenring, G. L., & Killias, M. (2021) · Campbell Systematic Reviews: Better Evidence for a Better World · doi:10.1002/cl2.1173 · Cited by 60 · see citing works
The impact of e-procurement on institutional quality
Mélon, L., & Spruk, R. (2020) · Journal of Public Procurement · doi:10.1108/jopp-07-2019-0050 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
- Authors
- Di Tella, R., & Schargrodsky, E.
- Affiliations
- Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (AR)
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2003-04
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 269-292
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W3123080973
- Cited by
- 620
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 59 · 2020: 48 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 30 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 29 · 2012: 35
- FWCI
- 83.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- The Journal of Law and Economics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Repositorio Digital Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-sa)
- bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Keywords
- public hospitals, input prices, wages, auditing, bribery, Buenos Aires
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