The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?
Abstract
In 1961, Vickrey showed that, in an independent private-values context with symmetric risk-neutral bidders, sealed second-price auctions have dominant truth-revealing equilibrium strategies, that they are perfectly efficient economically, and that they produce the same expected revenue for bid takers as equilibrium strategies in oral progressive auctions, Dutch auctions, or standard, first-price sealed bidding. Yet sealed second-price auctions seldom occur. We argue that fear of cheating and especially disincentives for bidders to follow truth-revealing strategies are important explanations. We model auctions in which third parties capture a fraction of the economic rent revealed by the second-price procedure.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Cited by
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
A market mechanism for electric power transmission
Chao, H.-P., & Peck, S. (1996) · Journal of Regulatory Economics · doi:10.1007/bf00133357 · Cited by 481
Some simple economics of the blockchain
Catalini, C., & Gans, J. S. (2020) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3359552 · Cited by 459
Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet
Lucking-Reiley, D. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.5.1063 · Cited by 446
(1996) · Cited by 160
Metadata
- Authors
- Rothkopf, M. H., Teisberg, T. J., & Kahn, E. P.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1990-02
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 94-109
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2004238298
- Cited by
- 383
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 8.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/261670
- The paper
- Rothkopf, M. H., Teisberg, T. J., & Kahn, E. P. (1990). Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261670
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
