Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet
Open accessAbstract
William Vickrey's predicted equivalences between first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, and between second-price sealed-bid and English auctions, are tested using field experiments that auctioned off collectible trading cards over the Internet. The results indicate that the Dutch auction produces 30-percent higher revenues than the first-price auction format, a violation of the theoretical prediction and a reversal of previous laboratory results, and that the English and second-price formats produce roughly equivalent revenues. (JEL C93, D44)
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Field experiments can create exogenous variation in variables of interest, allowing novel tests of economic theory.
“field experiments represent an exciting opportunity to test the validity and relevance of the predictions of economic theory.In contrast to traditional field studies, we can create exogenous variation in the variables of interest, allowing for novel tests of economic theory.”
From The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign (2002) · cites this paper as Lucking-Reiley 1999
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Research works printed but not linked: 25
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- Authors
- Lucking-Reiley, D.
- Affiliations
- Department of Economics, 415 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-12-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1063-1080
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1988168828
- Cited by
- 446
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 2 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 24
- FWCI
- 29.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- s3.amazonaws.com
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Visual Arts and Performing Arts › Art History and Market Analysis
- Keywords
- first-price sealed-bid auctions, Dutch auctions, second-price sealed-bid auction, English auctions, auction revenue, online auctions, field experiments
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