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Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market
Abstract
Most of the British electricity supply industry has been privatized. Two dominant generators supply bulk electricity to an unregulated "pool." They submit a supply schedule of prices for generation and receive the market-clearing price, which varies with demand. Despite claims that this should be highly competitive, we show that the Nash equilibrium in supply schedules implies a high markup on marginal cost and substantial deadweight losses. Further simulations, to show the effect of entry by 1994, produce somewhat lower prices, at the cost of excessive entry; subdividing the generators into five firms would produce better results.
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Citations
Cited by
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Fabra, N., & Reguant, M. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.9.2872 · Cited by 491
Hortaçsu, A., & Puller, S. L. (2008) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00005.x · Cited by 432
Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage
Fowlie, M. L. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.1.2.72 · Cited by 176
Negotiating effective institutions against climate change
Gollier, C., & Tirole, J. (2015) · Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy · doi:10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.cgol · Cited by 116
Market Power and Joint Ownership: Evidence from Nuclear Plants in Sweden
Lundin, E. (2016) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2743221 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Green, R. J., & Newbery, D. M.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1992-10
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 929-953
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2067673416
- Cited by
- 1,336
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Green, R. J., & Newbery, D. M. (1992). Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261846
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