The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Understanding strategic bidding in multi‐unit auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market
Abstract
We examine the bidding behavior of firms in the Texas electricity spot market, where bidders submit hourly supply schedules to sell power. We characterize an equilibrium model of bidding and use detailed firm‐level data on bids and marginal costs to compare actual bidding behavior to theoretical benchmarks. Firms with large stakes in the market performed close to the theoretical benchmark of static profit maximization. However, smaller firms utilized excessively steep bid schedules significantly deviating from this benchmark. Further analysis suggests that payoff scale has an important effect on firms' willingness and ability to participate in complex, strategic market environments.
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Cites
Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators
Hansen, L. P. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912775 · Cited by 13,467
The Handbook of Experimental Economics
(1995) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691213255 · Cited by 2,051
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
Klemperer, P. D., & Meyer, M. A. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913707 · Cited by 1,382
Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market
Green, R. J., & Newbery, D. M. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261846 · Cited by 1,336
Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power
Bresnahan, T. F. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)02005-4 · Cited by 1,271
The Handbook of Experimental Economics
(2020) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvzsmff5 · Cited by 1,105
Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J. B., & Wolak, F. A. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024557 · Cited by 941
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
Ausubel, L. M., Cramton, P., Pycia, M., Rostek, M., & Weretka, M. (2014) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdu023 · Cited by 800
7. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research
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Fabra, N., & Reguant, M. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.9.2872 · Cited by 491
Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage
Fowlie, M. L. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.1.2.72 · Cited by 176
Uniform Pricing in US Retail Chains
DellaVigna, S., & Gentzkow, M. (2017) · doi:10.3386/w23996 · Cited by 75
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Baudry, M., Faure, A., & Quemin, S. (2021) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102468 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Hortaçsu, A., & Puller, S. L.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 86-114
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-2171
- OpenAlex
- W2140281944
- Cited by
- 432
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 36.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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