The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Occupational Choice and the Process of Development
Abstract
This paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents' occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth. Because of capital market imperfections, poor agents choose working for a wage over self-employment, and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers. Only with sufficient inequality, however, will there be employment contracts; otherwise, there is either subsistence or self-employment. Thus, in static equilibrium, the occupational structure depends on distribution. Since the latter is itself endogenous, we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long-run effects. In one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry (self-employment) or factory production (employment contracts), depending on the initial distribution; in the other example, it develops into prosperity or stagnation.
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“Higher taxation and redistribution may help increase investment opportunities in an economy with imperfect credit markets.”
From Taxation, Corruption, and Growth (2016) · cites this paper as Banerjee and Newman (1993)
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Cites
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Self-citationThe First Industrial Revolution, by Phyllis Deane
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ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, INFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENTPreprint
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Cited by
Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10766 · Cited by 3,545
Big bad banks? The winners and losers from bank deregulation in the United States
BECK, T., LEVINE, R., & LEVKOV, A. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01589.x · Cited by 3,358
Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10481 · Cited by 3,101
Chapter 12 Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01012-9 · Cited by 2,889
Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
(2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01006-3 · Cited by 2,472
Metadata
- Authors
- Banerjee, A. V., & Newman, A. F.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1993-04
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 274-298
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2032014665
- Cited by
- 3,087
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 34.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.