The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
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Citations
Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
Mirrlees, J. A. (1971) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296779 · Cited by 4,510
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
Ross, S. A. (1973) · American Economic Review · Cited by 4,269
Posner, R. A. (1974) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1227682 · Cited by 2,239
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5 · Cited by 942
Toward an Economic Theory of Liability
Brown, J. P. (1973) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467501 · Cited by 553
Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
Stiglitz, J. E. (1977) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296899 · Cited by 448
Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
Harris, M., & Townsend, R. M. (1981) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911125 · Cited by 434
Cited by
Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Bernanke, B., & Gertler, M. (1988) · Unknown · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.292693 · Cited by 4,386
Occupational Choice and the Process of Development
Banerjee, A. V., & Newman, A. F. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261876 · Cited by 3,087
A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development
Aghion, P., & Bolton, P. (1997) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2971707 · Cited by 1,690
Relational Incentive Contracts
Levin, J. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157115 · Cited by 1,099
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
Innes, R. D. (1990) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-s · Cited by 923
Metadata
- Authors
- Sappington, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1983-02
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-21
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1995959404
- Cited by
- 519
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 10.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Limited liability contracts between principal and agent. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90120-5
- The paper
- Sappington, D. (1983). Limited liability contracts between principal and agent. Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90120-5
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.