The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Public Provision of Private Goods
Abstract
Government may provide a good that can, if legally permitted, be supplemented by private purchases. Policy is determined by majority rule. Under standard assumptions on preferences, a majority voting equilibrium exists. A regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision. Combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual-provision regime than under either of the alternatives. Under some preference configurations, the median-income voter is pivotal; under others, a voter with income below the median is pivotal.
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Citations
Cites
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On the private provision of public goods
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Plott, C. R. (1967) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · Cited by 919
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The demand for episodes of treatment in the health insurance experiment
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Self-citation
Cited by
Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives
Epple, D., & Romano, R. E. (1996) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(95)01540-x · Cited by 415
Self-citationTransfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data
Currie, J., & Gahvari, F. (2008) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.46.2.333 · Cited by 402
Private Tutoring and Demand for Education in South Korea
Kim, S., & Lee, J. (2010) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/648186 · Cited by 347
Bryce, J., Victora, C. G., Habicht, J.-P., Black, R. E., & Scherpbier, R. W. (2005) · Health Policy and Planning · doi:10.1093/heapol/czi055 · Cited by 279
To Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracy
DE LA CROIX, D., & DOEPKE, M. (2009) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00529.x · Cited by 135
Metadata
- Authors
- Epple, D., & Romano, R. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1996-02
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57-84
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1965273083
- Cited by
- 388
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 23.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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