The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government
Abstract
This paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government. State government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950-88. Elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout, particularly among the poor, and a poorer pivotal voter. As predicted, we find that these changes, a fall in the income of voters relative to state income, and the ouster of Republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending.
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“If contests for power become more open, we would expect the demand for redistributive progressive taxation to increase, as suggested by the Meltzer-Richards (1981) framework and the empirical evidence in Husted and Kenny (1997).”
From Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little? (2014) · cites this paper as Husted and Kenny (1997)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Husted, T. A., & Kenny, L. W.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1997-02
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 54-82
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2057687391
- Cited by
- 330
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 26 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 14
- FWCI
- 7.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Local Government Finance and Decentralization
- Keywords
- government size, state government spending, local government spending, poll tax, literacy tests, voter turnout, social spending, pivotal voters
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