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Competitive Search Equilibrium
Open accessAbstract
In this paper, I construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions, which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters. I show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal. I also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay.
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Citations
Cited by
The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies
Shimer, R. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828572 · Cited by 2,731
Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey
Rogerson, R., Shimer, R., & Wright, R. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205105775362014 · Cited by 1,051
Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities
Piketty, T., Saez, E., & Stantcheva, S. (2014) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.6.1.230 · Cited by 713
Chapter 39 New developments in models of search in the labor market
Mortensen, D. T., & Pissarides, C. A. (1999) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30025-0 · Cited by 479
The Establishment-Level Behavior of Vacancies and Hiring *
Davis, S. J., Faberman, R. J., & Haltiwanger, J. C. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt002 · Cited by 370
The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions
Shimer, R. (2005) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/444551 · Cited by 341
Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle
Menzio, G., & Shi, S. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/660864 · Cited by 338
Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market
Alan, M. (2011) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s0169-7218(11)02409-9 · Cited by 329
Frictional Wage Dispersion in Search Models: A Quantitative Assessment
Hornstein, A., Krusell, P., & Violante, G. L. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.7.2873 · Cited by 286
Gender Discrimination in Job Ads: Evidence from China *
Kuhn, P., & Shen, K. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs046 · Cited by 279
Weill, P.-O. (2007) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00451.x · Cited by 273
Liquidity: A New Monetarist Perspective
Lagos, R., Rocheteau, G., & Wright, R. (2017) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20141195 · Cited by 267
Search and endogenous concentration of liquidity in asset markets
Vayanos, D., & Wang, T. (2007) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.08.001 · Cited by 258
Productivity Shocks, Long-Term Contracts, and Earnings Dynamics
Balke, N., & Lamadon, T. (2022) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20161622 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Moen, E. R.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1997-04
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 385-411
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1567071685
- Cited by
- 789
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 19.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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