The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Abstract
This paper considers the design of an optimal unemployment insurance system. The problem is modeled as a repeated principalagent problem involving a risk‐averse agent‐the unemployed worker‐and a risk‐neutral principal, which cannot monitor the agent's search effort. The optimal long‐term contract subject to the associated incentive constraints is characterized. This contract involves a replacement ratio that decreases throughout the unemployment spell and a wage tax after reemployment that, under some mild regularity conditions, increases with the lenght of the unemployment spell. Some numerical results are presented that suggest that the gains from switching to this optimal unemployment insurance scheme could be quite large. The performance of this optimal contract is also compared to alternative liquidity provision mechanisms.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Unemployment Insurance And Unemployment Spells
Meyer, B. (1988) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2546 · Cited by 1,270
On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
Spear, S. E., & Srivastava, S. (1987) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297484 · Cited by 637
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
Fudenberg, D., Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1990) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90048-o · Cited by 483
The Economic Effects of Unemployment Insurance in Canada: An Empirical Analysis of UI Disentitlement
Green, D. A., & Riddell, W. C. (1993) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298330 · Cited by 49
Cited by
The European Unemployment Dilemma
Ljungqvist, L., & Sargent, T. J. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250020 · Cited by 1,001
Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Chetty, R. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/588585 · Cited by 853
Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods
Chetty, R. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142910 · Cited by 666
Trade Shocks and Labor Adjustment: A Structural Empirical Approach
Artuç, E., Chaudhuri, S., & McLaren, J. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.1008 · Cited by 539
Productivity gains from unemployment insurance
Acemoglu, D., & Shimer, R. (2000) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(00)00035-0 · Cited by 378
Metadata
- Authors
- Hopenhayn, H. A., & Nicolini, J. P.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1997-04
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 412-438
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2052888666
- Cited by
- 588
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 25.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.