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On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future. We show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent's conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable. This representation reduces the multi-period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques. This reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract.
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Cited by
Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1994) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527003 · Cited by 827
The composition of international capital flows: risk sharing through foreign direct investment
Albuquerque, R. (2003) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(03)00013-8 · Cited by 365
Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment
DEMARZO, P. M., FISHMAN, M. J., HE, Z., & WANG, N. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01787.x · Cited by 325
Productivity Shocks, Long-Term Contracts, and Earnings Dynamics
Balke, N., & Lamadon, T. (2022) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20161622 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Spear, S. E., & Srivastava, S.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1987-10
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 599
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1996634090
- Cited by
- 637
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2297484
- The paper
- Spear, S. E., & Srivastava, S. (1987). On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297484
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
