Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 340

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives

Meyer, Margaret A., Vickers, John·1997·Journal of Political Economy
DOI 10.1086/262082
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

It is well known that comparative performance information (CPI) can enhance efficiency in static principal‐agent relationships by improving the trade‐off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts. In dynamic settings, however, there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives, for example, managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation. We show that the dynamic effects of CPI on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar (static) insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency. The overall welfare effects of CPI are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1086/262082

Cites

21 of 21 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 21 references

Cited by

See all 340

Metadata

Authors
Meyer, M. A., & Vickers, J.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Published
1997-06
Volume
105
Issue
3
Pages
547-581
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
DOI
10.1086/262082
OpenAlex
W2016793697
Cited by
340
References
21
FWCI
11.56
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/262082
The paper
Meyer, M. A., & Vickers, J. (1997). Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/262082

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.