The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives
Abstract
It is well known that comparative performance information (CPI) can enhance efficiency in static principal‐agent relationships by improving the trade‐off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts. In dynamic settings, however, there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives, for example, managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation. We show that the dynamic effects of CPI on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar (static) insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency. The overall welfare effects of CPI are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure.
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Citations
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Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Dixit, A. (2002) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/3069614 · Cited by 1,104
Tirole, J. (1996) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298112 · Cited by 1,065
INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE*
VIVES, X. (2008) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00356.x · Cited by 674
Metadata
- Authors
- Meyer, M. A., & Vickers, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1997-06
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 547-581
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2016793697
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 11.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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