Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets
Abstract
The first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context. We also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations. To illustrate this claim, we use data on contracts and accidents to investigate the extent of asymmetric information in the French market for automobile insurance. Using various parametric and nonparametric methods, we find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in this market.
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Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
Cardon, J. H., & Hendel, I. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696362 · Cited by 411 · see citing works
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Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice
Cohen, A., & Einav, L. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.745 · Cited by 708 · see citing works
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
Handel, B. R. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.2643 · Cited by 707 · see citing works
Health Insurance for “Humans”: Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare
Handel, B. R., & Kolstad, J. T. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20131126 · Cited by 427 · see citing works
The Use of Telematics Devices to Improve Automobile Insurance Rates
Guillen, M., Nielsen, J. P., Ayuso, M., & Pérez‐Marín, A. M. (2019) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/risa.13172 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
Dynamic Moral Hazard: A Longitudinal Examination of Automobile Insurance in Canada
Shi, P., Zhang, W., & Boucher, J. (2018) · Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.1111/jori.12172 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Switching motivation and moral hazard: evidence from automobile physical damage insurance in Taiwan
Liu, C.-T., Wu, J.-Y., & Chang, C.-H. (2020) · The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice · doi:10.1057/s41288-019-00158-2 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
- Authors
- Chiappori, P., & Salanie, B.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2000-02
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 56-78
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2132942366
- Cited by
- 1,013
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 48 · 2017: 41 · 2016: 52 · 2015: 61 · 2014: 72 · 2013: 69 · 2012: 54
- FWCI
- 42.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Insurance and Financial Risk Management
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- information asymmetry, insurance market, automobile insurance, contract theory, competitive markets, insurance contracts, crash data, French insurance market
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