Health Insurance for “Humans”: Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The administrative data are similar to those recently used in the literature studying insurance provision at large self-insured firms.

“These administrative data are similar to those recently used in the literature studying insurance provision at large self-insured firms (see, e.g., Einav et al. 2013; Carlin and Town 2010; or Handel 2013).”

• cites Einav et al. 2013 sourcePartly supported

  The Baseline sample section describes employee-level insurance choices, plan menus, and detailed medical claims from Alcoa, a large firm. This supports the comparison to administrative data used to study insurance provision at large firms, but the passages do not establish that Alcoa was self-insured. (LLM, conf=0.83)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites Carlin and Town 2010Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Handel 2013 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

In the recent literature, people usually either model inertia explicitly or study active choice settings.

“In the recent literature mentioned earlier, people usually either model inertia explicitly (e.g., Handel 2013) or study active choice settings (e.g., Einav et al. 2013).”

• cites Handel 2013 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Einav et al. 2013 sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Baicker, Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein (2015) studies medical care utilization with a welfare model that implies a gap between the choices consumers make and the choices that maximize their welfare if fully informed.

“In concurrent work, Baicker, Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein (2015) studies medical care utilization with a welfare model that also implies a gap between the choices consumers make and the choices that maximize their welfare if fully informed.”

• cites Baicker, Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein (2015) sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Beshears et al. (2008) discuss potential ways to distinguish between revealed and normative preferences.

“Beshears et al. (2008) discuss potential ways to distinguish between revealed and normative preferences.”

• cites Beshears et al. (2008) sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

The most influential frictions measured are a lack of information about available medical providers/treatments and perceived time and hassle costs for the HDHP plan.

“The most influential frictions we measure are a lack of information about available medical providers/treatments and perceived time and hassle costs for the HDHP plan.”

May combine two claims.

Information frictions and hassle cost perceptions matter for consumer choices.

“Overall, our descriptive analyses suggest that information frictions and hassle cost perceptions matter for choices”

May combine two claims.

The baseline model with inertia implies a more than double $148 relative loss, and without inertia implies a $511 relative loss.

“The baseline model with (without) inertia implies a more than double $148 ($511) relative loss.”

May combine two claims.

Without the linked survey data, these frictions would primarily be proxied for by risk preference estimates as in the baseline model, but once included, the degree of estimated risk aversion is substantially reduced.

“Without the linked survey data, these frictions would primarily be proxied for by risk preference estimates as in our baseline model, but, once we include them, the degree of estimated risk aversion is substantially reduced.”

May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

Under the baseline model, a price elasticity of demand for health care utilization of at least 0.280 would be necessary to justify the policy shift to the HDHP, while under the full model the elasticity would be 0.178.

“Under the baseline model, with higher risk aversion, a price elasticity of demand for health care utilization of at least 0.280 would be necessary to justify the policy shift to the HDHP, while under the full model the elasticity would be 0.178.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The PPO option had the largest share of employees over time, and had been the primary health insurance plan for many years prior to the introduction of the HDHP option in 2009.

“The PPO option had the largest share of employees over time, and had been the primary health insurance plan for many years prior to the introduction of the HDHP option in 2009.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

All HSA funds can be invested in a pretax manner over time, providing similar benefits to those of a 401(k) investment.

“Finally, in addition to the pretax benefits for medical expenditures, all HSA funds can be invested in a pretax manner over time, providing similar benefits to those of a 401(k) investment.”

May combine two claims.

The PPO plan charges no upfront premium while the HDHP provides an upfront subsidy equal to $1,500 for an individual, $3,000 for a couple, and $3,750 for a family.

“The PPO plan charges no upfront premium while the HDHP provides an upfront subsidy equal to $1,500 for an individual, $3,000 for a couple, and $3,750 for a family.”

May combine two claims.

Forty-nine percent of incumbent HDHP enrollees, 41 percent of new HDHP enrollees, and 32 percent of PPO enrollees understand that one can access the same physicians in-network in both plans.

“Forty-nine percent of incumbent HDHP enrollees, 41 percent of new HDHP enrollees, and 32 percent of PPO enrollees understand that one can access the same physicians in-network in both plans.”

May combine two claims.

There are clear patterns in the raw survey responses that are consistent with limited information, as well as time and hassle costs.

“There are clear patterns in the raw survey responses that are consistent with limited information, as well as time and hassle costs.”

May combine two claims.

Those who expect to have lower hassle costs also have lower expenditures and, thus, ignoring utility from those time/hassle costs, should choose the HDHP in higher proportions.

“The figure indicates that those who expect to have lower hassle costs also have lower expenditures and, thus, ignoring utility from those time/hassle costs, should choose the HDHP in higher proportions.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

If employees want to use these funds for nonmedical expenditures at any point in their lives, they can do so on a post-tax basis.

“If employees want to use these funds for nonmedical expenditures at any point in their lives, they can do so on a post-tax basis.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The HDHP has a substantial deductible equal to $1,500 for individuals, $3,000 for a couple (or parent and one child), and $3,750 for a family.

“Alternatively, the HDHP has a substantial deductible equal to $1,500 for individuals, $3,000 for a couple (or parent and one child), and $3,750 for a family.”

May combine two claims.

Only 11 percent of PPO enrollees report not being concerned that they may need to spend time managing health care costs compared to 39 percent of existing HDHP enrollees.

“Only 11 percent of PPO enrollees report not being concerned that they may need to spend time managing health care costs compared to 39 percent of existing HDHP enrollees.”

May combine two claims.

Similar shares of both groups believe the reverse or are not sure.

“Similar shares of both groups believe the reverse or are”

May combine two claims.

For 2013, just past the end of the study period, the firm transitioned away from the PPO option and moved all employees previously enrolled there to the HDHP.

“For 2013, just past the end of our study period, the firm transitioned away from the PPO option and moved all employees previously enrolled there to the HDHP.”

May combine two claims.

A similar pattern holds for questions about post-deductible co-insurance rate and out-of-pocket maximum in the HDHP, though fewer respondents have information on these characteristics relative to the deductible.

“A similar pattern holds for the questions asking about the post-deductible co-insurance rate and the out-of-pocket maximum in the HDHP, though fewer respondents have information on these characteristics, relative to the deductible.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The HDHP subsidy is deposited into the HSA linked to that plan and can be used for medical expenditures on a pretax basis in both the short run and the long run.

“The HDHP subsidy is deposited into the HSA linked to that plan and, thus, can be used for medical expenditures on a pretax basis in both the short run and the long run.”

May combine two claims.

29 percent of PPO enrollees answer that they would expect to spend more than 20 hours on HDHP plan administration and logistics, while only 6 percent and 8 percent do in the two HDHP cohorts.

“29 percent of PPO enrollees answer that they would expect to spend more than 20 hours on HDHP plan administration and logistics, while only 6 percent and 8 percent do in the two HDHP cohorts.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The linked HSA can provide additional value to employees, above and beyond the subsidy, as employees can contribute their own funds pretax to the HSA, up to a maximum of $3,150 for individuals and $6,250 for all others (gross of the subsidy).

“The linked HSA can also provide additional value to employees, above and beyond the subsidy, as employees can contribute their own funds pretax to the HSA, up to a maximum of $3,150 for individuals and $6,250 for all others (gross of the subsidy).”

May combine two claims.

The PPO option has no in-network deductible, no in-network co-insurance, and no in-network out-of-pocket maximum.

“On the financial dimension, the PPO option is the simpler and more comprehensive of the two options in terms of cost-sharing: it has no in-network deductible, no in-network co-insurance, and no in-network outof-pocket maximum.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

In the HDHP, after the deductible, the employee pays co-insurance of 10 percent for in-network providers and 30 percent for out-of-network providers until total spending exceeds the out-of-pocket maximum ($2,500 for individuals, $5,000 for a couple, and $6,250 for a family), at which point all expenditures are paid by the insurer.

“In that plan, once an employee spends an amount in excess of the deductible, he must then pay co-insurance of 10 percent of allowed costs for in-network providers and 30 percent for out-of-network providers until his total spending exceeds the out-of-pocket maximum-$2,500 for individuals, $5,000 for a couple, and $6,250 for a family-at which point all expenditures are paid by the insurer.”

May combine two claims.

The PPO and HDHP have substantial differences in financial characteristics (e.g., premium, deductible, out-of-pocket maximum, HSA benefits) but, conditional on these financial elements, are identical on all other key features.

“The PPO and HDHP have substantial differences in financial characteristics (e.g., premium, deductible, out-of-pocket maximum, HSA benefits) but, conditional on these financial elements, are identical on all other key features.”

May combine two claims.

More PPO enrollees answered incorrectly than correctly about the HDHP deductible, though the majority were not sure.

“In fact, more PPO enrollees answered incorrectly than correctly, though the majority were”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Since the HDHP introduction, the firm has promoted the financial benefits of that plan to employees in order to incentivize employees to economize on potentially wasteful medical expenditures.

“Since the HDHP introduction, the firm has promoted the financial benefits of that plan to employees in order to incentivize employees to economize on potentially wasteful medical expenditures (while returning some of those savings in the process).”

May combine two claims.

37.2 percent of consumers who expected to spend 1-5 hours on plan administration and logistics in the HDHP choose that plan, while only 5.1 percent of those who expect to spend > 20 hours on these activities choose that plan.

“37.2 percent of consumers who expected to spend 1-5 hours on plan administration and logistics in the HDHP choose that plan, while only 5.1 percent of those who expect to spend > 20 hours on these activities choose that plan.”

May combine two claims.

Approximately 70 percent of HDHP enrollees know the premium difference between the two plans, linked to the HSA subsidy, while only 20 percent of PPO enrollees do.

“Approximately 70 percent of HDHP enrollees know the premium difference between the two plans, linked to the HSA subsidy, while only 20 percent of PPO enrollees do.”

May combine two claims.

Almost all HDHP enrollees know that HSA funds can be rolled over from year to year, while approximately 75 percent of PPO enrollees do.

“Almost all HDHP enrollees know that HSA funds can be rolled over from year to year, while approximately 75 percent of PPO enrollees do.”

May combine two claims.

In the full model (primary specification, column 3 of Table 4), consumers who believe that the PPO plan has a larger network of medical providers value the HDHP by $2,326 less than someone who correctly knows that these plans grant the same access; this difference is significantly different from 0, with a 95 percent CI upper bound of -$1,286.

“Consumers who believe that the PPO plan has a larger network of medical providers value the HDHP by $2,326 less than someone who correctly knows that these plans grants the same access (significantly different from 0, 95 percent CI upper bound of -$1,286).”

May combine two claims.

The moral hazard impact is small relative to the overall difference in consumers' plan valuations and does not markedly impact the parameter estimates.

“The results show the moral hazard impact is small relative to the overall difference in consumers' plan valuations and thus does not markedly impact our parameter estimates.”

May combine two claims.

In the full model, the point estimates for the effects of underestimating and overestimating total medical expenditures are wrong signed but not statistically different from zero.

“Though the point estimates are wrong signed they are not statistically different from zero.”

May combine two claims.

New employees are slightly more likely to choose the HDHP, likely to be younger, likely to have lower income, and more likely to be single.

“New employees are slightly more likely to choose the HDHP, likely to be younger, likely to have lower income, and more likely to be single.”

May combine two claims.

In the full model, the mean gamble interpretation of X is 920.47, lying well above 864.68, the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval for the baseline model with inertia.

“For risk preferences, in the full model we estimate a mean gamble interpretation of X = 920.47, lying well above 864.68, the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval for the baseline model with inertia.”

May combine two claims.

The distribution of information types is skewed toward uninformed, but with substantial heterogeneity and a non-negligible mass of highly informed consumers.

“The figure reveals that the distribution of types is skewed toward uninformed, but with substantial heterogeneity and a non-negligible mass of highly informed consumers.”

May combine two claims.

In the baseline model with inertia, employee age is negatively related to risk aversion and significant at the 95 percent level, while female and income are also negatively related but small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero.

“As in the baseline model, employee age is negatively related to risk aversion, significant at the 95 percent level, while female and income are also negatively related but with effects small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero.”

May combine two claims.

In the incremental models, the coefficients for total medical expenditure knowledge and plan financial characteristic knowledge frictions are negative and large in magnitude, implying a distaste for the HDHP as expected.

“in the incremental models the coefficients for these frictions are negative and large in magnitude, implying a distaste for the HDHP as expected.”

May combine two claims.

In the types model, the average effect of frictions on HDHP utility is -$3,056 with standard deviation 2,299, both somewhat larger than these figures for the full model.

“The average effect of frictions on HDHP utility is -$3,056 with standard deviation 2,299 both somewhat larger that these figures for the full model”

May combine two claims.

Across the three cohorts, 36-42 percent answer correctly, 29-36 percent overestimate their past expenditures, and 17-24 percent underestimate them.

“Across the three cohorts, 36-42 percent answer the question correctly, 29-36 percent overestimate their past expenditures, and 17-24 percent underestimate them.”

May combine two claims.

In the baseline model, the average consumer has a high degree of risk aversion, with a gamble interpretation X = $366.74, the amount the average consumer would be willing to lose to be indifferent about accepting a hypothetical gamble.

“The results reveal that the average consumer has what seems like a high degree of risk aversion with X = $366.74being the amount this consumer would be willing to lose to be just indifferent about accepting the hypothetical gamble.”

May combine two claims.

In the types model, the second most informed quartile has an average $1,158 disutility for the HDHP compared with the most informed consumers (top quartile), with values of $3,547 and $6,803 for the third and fourth most informed quartiles respectively.

“The second most informed quartile has an average $1,158 disutility for the HDHP compared with the most informed consumers (top quartile), with values of $3,547 and $6,803 for the third and fourth most informed quartiles respectively”

May combine two claims.

In the structural model (column 4), estimated mean risk aversion yields a mean gamble interpretation of X = 952.89, lying well above the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval for the baseline model with inertia (and just above that upper bound for our primary full model estimates).

“Estimated mean risk aversion in this model yields a mean gamble interpretation of X = 952.89, lying well above the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval for the baseline model with inertia (and just above that upper bound for our primary full model estimates).”

May combine two claims.

In the baseline model with inertia, σγ is much lower than in the baseline model and is approximately 60 percent of the much lower average μγ.

“Notably, σ γ is now much lower in the model with inertia relative to the baseline model as it is approximately 60 percent of the much lower average μ γ .”

May combine two claims.

New HDHP enrollees exhibit similar information levels to existing enrollees, indicating that people with a full year of plan experience do not know much more than those who just signed up.

“new HDHP enrollees exhibit similar information levels to existing enrollees, indicating that people with a full year of plan experience do not know much more than those who just signed up.”

The quote only partly states this claim.

The 95 percent CIs for each informed quartile's disutility do not overlap with each other.

“The 95 percent CIs for each quartile do not overlap with each other.”

May combine two claims.

The upper bounds on the 95 percent CIs for the coefficients on time and hassle costs for strong dislike and 'accepts but is concerned' are -$79.74 and -$65.51, respectively.

“These are relatively precise estimates: the upper bounds on the 95 percent CIs for these coefficients are -$79.74and -$65.51,respectively.”

May combine two claims.

The baseline model predicts a mean welfare loss of $1,237 from the forced switch, with a population standard deviation of $851.

“The baseline model, where consumers are estimated to be more risk averse, predicts a mean welfare loss of $1,237 from the forced switch, with a population standard deviation of $851 .”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: All information frictions are non-welfare-relevant conditional on enrollment in the HDHP.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The welfare-relevant utility (or utility conditional on enrollment) is that of a perfectly informed consumer that faces traditional uncertainty with respect to medical expenditures.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The sample is about 80 percent of the size of the mean number of employees present in each year from 2009-2012.

“This sample is about 80 percent of the size of the mean number of employees present in each year from 2009-2012.”

May combine two claims.

This elasticity is 0.197 for the inertial baseline model, 0.178 for the full model, and 0.164 under a simple risk neutral model.

“This elasticity is 0.197 for the inertial baseline model, 0.178 for the full model, and 0.164 under a simple risk neutral model.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Reduced medical expenditures come from reductions in purely wasteful services (for the lower bound calculation).
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Rational consumers value foregone services at a rate between zero and the marginal HDHP price (for the upper bound calculation).
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The normal distribution for γ heterogeneity is truncated at 0.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Very few employees enroll in the HDHP in 2011 and switch to the PPO in 2012.

“Very few employees enroll in the HDHP in 2011 and switch to the PPO in 2012.”

May combine two claims.

Excluding the first-stage inertia estimates substantially increases the impact of both plan financial knowledge measures and total medical expenditure knowledge measures, while moderately impacting other estimates.

“excluding the first-stage inertia estimates substantially increases the impact of both plan financial knowledge measures and total medical expenditure knowledge measures, while moderately impacting other estimates.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The baseline model without inertia difference is $511.

“(the baseline model without inertia difference is $511 ).”

May combine two claims.

The full model predicts $62 lower consumer surplus than the risk neutral case, while the baseline model with inertia predicts a $148 relative loss, almost two-and-a-half times as large as that from the full model.

“The full model predicts $62 lower consumer surplus than the risk neutral case, while the baseline model with inertia predicts a $148 relative loss, almost two-and-a-half times as large as that from the full model”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Approximately 5 percent of employees in the relevant locations choose the HMO option, remaining steady over time.

“Since approximately 5 percent of employees in the relevant locations choose this option (remaining steady over time) we exclude those who choose the HMO from our analysis and do not include the HMO option in our choice estimation.”

May combine two claims.

Both types models have very high LR test statistics relative to the baseline model with inertia (as do our full model specifications).

“Both types models have very high LR test statistics relative to the baseline model with inertia (as do our full model specifications).”

May combine two claims.

The model with structural frictions predicts mean consumer surplus loss of $741 with standard deviation $1,060.

“while these values are $741 and $1,060 respectively for the model with structural frictions.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: All information frictions are non-welfare-relevant conditional on enrollment in the HDHP.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The welfare-relevant utility (or utility conditional on enrollment) is that of a perfectly informed consumer that faces traditional uncertainty with respect to medical expenditures.

May combine two claims.

Both information frictions and perceived hassle costs are important factors for consumer health insurance choices at the large employer studied.

“we leveraged novel, individually linked, administrative, and survey data to show that both information frictions and perceived hassle costs are important factors for consumer health insurance choices at the large employer we study.”

May combine two claims.

The upper bound on the minimum elasticity to justify the policy change, when foregone medical care is valued at the marginal price, is 0.407 in the baseline model, 0.286 in the inertial baseline model, 0.258 in the full model, and 0.237 for the risk neutral model.

“The upper bound on the minimum elasticity to justify the policy change, when foregone medical care is valued at the marginal price, is 0.407 in the baseline model, 0.286 in the inertial baseline model, 0.258 in the full model, and 0.237 for the risk neutral model.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Reduced medical expenditures come from reductions in purely wasteful services (for the lower bound calculation).
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Rational consumers value foregone services at a rate between zero and the marginal HDHP price (for the upper bound calculation).

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The additional choice factors studied can matter for choice analysis, welfare analysis, and policy analysis, but the exact implications will depend on the specific context.

“We illustrate here that the additional choice factors we study can matter for choice analysis, welfare analysis, and policy analysis, but the exact implications will depend on the specific context.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

In the simple case, the insurance plan decision depends on the consumer's out-of-pocket payment under different scenarios and his degree of risk aversion; health insurance is a tool for financial risk protection.

“In this simple case, the insurance plan decision depends on the consumer's out-of-pocket payment under different scenarios and his degree of risk aversion; health insurance is a tool for financial risk protection.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Accordingly, individual choices reflect real preferences for trading off premiums in exchange for shifts in either the distribution of out-of-pocket spending or nonfinancial attributes across different plans.

“Accordingly, individual choices reflect real preferences for trading off premiums in exchange for shifts in either the distribution of out-of-pocket spending or nonfinancial attributes across different plans.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The survey was conducted after consumers made their plan choices, potentially leading to confirmation bias or consumer forgetting and learning between open enrollment and survey administration.

“Third, the survey was conducted after consumers made their plan choices, potentially leading to (i) confirmation bias or (ii) consumer forgetting and learning between open enrollment and the survey administration.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Plans differ by the network of physicians and hospitals available, the time and hassle costs associated with dealing with claims, and the tax benefits of linked financial accounts.

“Plans differ by the network of physicians and hospitals available, the time and hassle costs associated with dealing with claims, and the tax benefits of linked financial accounts.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The individual knows with certainty the density of expenditures, can place a probability weight on each illness, knows treatment costs, and understands the terms of different plan options.

“However, he does know with certainty the density of expenditures-implicitly he is able to place a probability weight on each of the different illnesses that might befall him, know how much the appropriate treatment would cost, and understand the terms of the different plan options that result in different rates of cost sharing depending on expenditures/ illness states.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Incorporating information friction and hassle costs measures into typical insurance choice models could either increase or decrease the extent of estimated risk aversion.

“From a theoretical perspective, incorporating information friction and hassle costs measures into typical insurance choice models could either increase or decrease the extent of estimated risk aversion.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Individuals are willing to pay a higher premium for a plan if it reduces the mean or variance of expected out-of-pocket spending, and their willingness to pay for the latter is increasing in risk aversion.

“Individuals are willing to pay a higher premium for a plan if it reduces the mean or variance of expected out-of-pocket spending and their willingness to pay for the latter is increasing in risk aversion.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The standard model assumes that when individuals make insurance choices they can access and process the information necessary to make correct decisions under uncertainty.

“Importantly, this model assumes that when individuals make insurance choices they can access and process the information necessary to make correct decisions under uncertainty.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The model elements can be observed in widely available administrative datasets (e.g., expected expenditures for an individual and the plan options).

“Further, the model elements can be observed in widely available administrative datasets (e.g., expected expenditures for an individual and the plan options).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

All results presented are specific to the large employer context studied.

“We also note that all results presented here are specific to the large employer context that we study.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Health insurance plans are differentiated products across a variety of dimensions beyond simple financial risk protection.

“More generally, health insurance plans are differentiated products across a variety of dimensions beyond simple financial risk protection.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

This assumption is critical and underlies positive analysis of choice patterns throughout the literature on health insurance markets.

“This assumption is critical and underlies positive analysis of choice patterns throughout the literature on health insurance markets.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The survey data are subject to potential concerns: consumer answers may reflect information about the specific plan dimension studied as well as other correlated factors, implying the answers are signals about information frictions rather than direct measurements.

“First, consumer answers may reflect information about the specific plan dimension studied as well as other correlated factors, implying the answers given are signals about information frictions rather than direct measurements of them.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The canonical model of preferences for health insurance is based on a risk averse consumer who would prefer to pay a fixed premium to avoid losses in the bad state of the world in which he becomes sick.

“The canonical model of preferences for health insurance is based on a risk averse consumer who would prefer to pay a fixed premium to avoid losses in the bad state of the world in which he becomes sick (see, e.g., Arrow 1963 or Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976).”

• cites Arrow 1963Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

In the standard model, the choice of insurance plan relies entirely on individuals' risk preferences, their expenditure projections, and their values for plan attributes.

“In the model above, the choice of insurance plan relies entirely on individuals' risk preferences, their expenditure projections, and their values for plan attributes.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The individual making a choice has uncertainty over health care expenditures in different states of the world.

“The individual making a choice has uncertainty over health care expenditures in different states of the world.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Modern health insurance is not a purely financial product.

“To better reflect actual choices, we must account for the fact that modern health insurance is not a purely financial product.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

In the extended model, consumers still value plans as tools for risk protection, but may also be willing to pay more for a plan with valuable nonfinancial attributes.

“In this model, consumers still value plans as tools for risk protection, but, in addition, may be willing to pay more for a plan with valuable nonfinancial attributes.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

With the rise of managed care and alternate benefit designs, the insurance one holds can determine the type of care available, the total price paid, and the hospitals and doctors one can access.

“With the rise of managed care and alternate benefit designs, the insurance one holds can determine the type of care available, the total price paid, and the hospitals and doctors one can access.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The introductions of health savings accounts (HSA) and flexible spending accounts (FSA) have introduced additional plan attributes not directly related to consumer risk protection.

“The introductions of health savings accounts (HSA) and flexible spending accounts (FSA) have introduced additional plan attributes not directly related to consumer risk protection.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Plans can have varying degrees of time and hassle costs linked to plan administration and logistics (e.g., dealing with medical bills).

“Plans can also have varying degrees of time and hassle costs linked to plan administration and logistics (e.g., dealing with medical bills).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

There may be selection into answering the survey on unobservable dimensions that are correlated with information about health plan choices.

“Second, there may be selection into answering the survey on unobservable dimensions that are correlated with information about health plan choices.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The direction of the effect of incorporating information frictions and hassle costs on estimated risk aversion depends directly on the plans consumers can choose between and the relative information they have about each option.

“The direction of this effect will depend directly on the plans consumers can choose between and the relative information they have about each option.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

These data, combined with individually-linked survey data, allow us to move beyond this work and study multiple additional micro-foundations that could impact both plan enrollment and consumer welfare.

“These data, combined with individually-linked survey data, allow us to move beyond this work and study multiple additional micro-foundations that could impact both plan enrollment and consumer welfare.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Consumer choices no longer necessarily reflect the exact attributes of the plans (and preferences over those attributes) but, instead, beliefs about those attributes that could be incorrect.

“Consumer choices no longer necessarily reflect the exact attributes of the plans (and preferences over those attributes) but, instead, beliefs about those attributes that could be incorrect.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Without the assumption of full information, in the standard model where preferences are merely over financial risk, the consumer might not know or understand the financial attributes that differentiate each plan, implying an inability to accurately forecast spending in each option.

“Without the assumption of full information, in the standard model where preferences are merely over financial risk the consumer might not know or understand the financial attributes that differentiate each plan, implying an inability to accurately forecast spending in each option.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Individuals may not have perfect information on the nonfinancial attributes of plan options (e.g., provider networks and hassle costs), particularly in the absence of having experience with a plan.

“Similarly, individuals may not have perfect information on the nonfinancial attributes of plan options (e.g., provider networks and hassle costs), particularly in the absence of having experience with a plan.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Without the assumption of full information, assessing welfare using revealed preference becomes more challenging.

“Without this assumption, assessing welfare using revealed preference becomes more challenging (see, e.g., Spinnewijn 2012 and Bernheim and Rangel 2009).”

• cites Spinnewijn 2012Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Bernheim and Rangel 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

While choices may be affected by information frictions, these frictions may not impact true, welfare-relevant, utility conditional on enrolling in a given plan option.

“While choices may be affected by information frictions, these frictions may not impact true, welfare-relevant, utility conditional on enrolling in a given plan option (captured in equation (2)).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

There are many ways that choices could differ from the model described in equation (2).

“There are many ways that choices could differ from the model described in equation (2).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

This allows us to model relative consumer welfare from plan enrollment as a function of financial characteristics and subsequent risk exposure, rather than medical care differentiation.

“This allows us to model relative consumer welfare from plan enrollment as a function of financial characteristics and subsequent risk exposure, rather than medical care differentiation.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

This subsidy should be interpreted as the primary premium for the PPO relative to the HDHP.

“This subsidy should be interpreted as the primary premium for the PPO relative to the HDHP.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Our empirical setting provides exactly that, by combining administrative data on claims and choices of insurance with a detailed survey on consumer information about plan attributes and key risk characteristics.

“Our empirical setting provides exactly that, by combining administrative data on claims and choices of insurance with a detailed survey on consumer information about plan attributes and key risk characteristics.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

To compare the model in equation (2) to equation (3) requires both data on actual choices and plan attributes as well as measures of information and beliefs about plan attributes (or, alternatively, exogenous variation in the choice environment).

“To compare the model in equation (2) to equation (3) requires both data on actual choices and plan attributes as well as measures of information and beliefs about plan attributes (or, alternatively, exogenous variation in the choice environment).”

May combine two claims.

The answers to the rollover question suggest that there is real information content in the survey question answers, as most PPO enrollees can answer this simple question regarding the HDHP correctly.

“The answers to this question suggest that there is real information content in the survey question answers, as most PPO enrollees can answer this simple question regarding the HDHP correctly (rather than, e.g.,”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Addressing empirically whether information frictions exist and how important they are has been a challenge because the data requirements are substantial.

“Addressing this empirically has been a challenge because the data requirements are substantial.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The feature that is perhaps most critical and potentially unlikely to hold in practice is that consumers are fully informed about health plan attributes.

“The feature that is perhaps most critical and potentially unlikely to hold in practice is that consumers are fully informed about health plan attributes.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

If the impact of frictions is correlated with expected medical spending or other moments of F, this could impact risk preference estimates in the full model.

“if the impact of frictions is correlated with expected medical spending (or other moments of F ), then this could also impact risk preference estimates in the full model.”

May combine two claims.

In 2011, approximately 85 percent of consumers enroll in the PPO plan, so the β coefficients can be thought of as generally indexing the non-default plan when inertia is explicitly excluded.

“This approach works because, in 2011, approximately 85 percent of consumers enroll in the PPO plan so the β coefficients can also be thought of as generally indexing the non-default plan when inertia is explicitly excluded.”

May combine two claims.

The frictions with respect to total medical expenditure knowledge and plan financial characteristic knowledge imply lower utility for the HDHP plan on their own, but are overpowered by the other friction measures present in the full model.

“This suggests that these frictions do imply lower utility for the HDHP plan on their own, but, are overpowered by the other friction measures present in the full model.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

If the assumption that risk preferences and frictions are independent is violated but maintained for estimation, risk aversion could be over- or under-estimated depending on the true correlation between risk preferences and frictions.

“If the assumption that risk preferences and frictions are independent is violated, but we maintain that assumption for estimation, then risk aversion could be over or under estimated depending on the true correlation between risk preferences and frictions.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Risk preferences γ are independent of friction measures Z.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Friction measures are independent of inertia, conditional on demographics.

May combine two claims.

Private information and moral hazard effects are likely to be quite small relative to consumers' total relative valuations of the two plans.

“Both effects are likely to be quite small relative to consumers' total relative valuations of the two plans.”

May combine two claims.

Unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences becomes much smaller in the full models with information frictions, time and hassle costs, and inertia, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity in γ may be capturing information measured directly in the survey data.

“This unobserved heterogeneity becomes much smaller as we move to the full models with information frictions, time/hassle costs, and inertia, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity in γ may be capturing information that we measure directly in our survey data.”

May combine two claims.

While individuals are not well equipped to estimate their total expenditures in the past year, even to the level of expenditure buckets, people do not appear to recognize this lack of understanding.

“Thus, while it appears individuals are not well equipped to estimate their total expenditures in the past year, even to the level of expenditure buckets, people do not appear to recognize this lack of understanding.”

May combine two claims.

There is meaningful multi-dimensional heterogeneity across these frictions, and modeling them in a disaggregated manner could be fruitful.

“This suggests that there is meaningful multi-dimensional heterogeneity across these frictions, and that modeling them in a disaggregated manner could be fruitful.”

May combine two claims.

New employees span the ranges of age, gender, and income seen in the full population with non-negligible mass, such that estimates of preferences based on observable heterogeneity can credibly be extrapolated from one group to the other.

“Importantly, new employees span the ranges of age, gender, and income seen in the full population with non-negligible mass, such that estimates of preferences based on observable heterogeneity can credibly be extrapolated from one group to the other.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

While risk preferences impact both choices and welfare, a lack of information may be relevant for choices given a menu of options but may not impact actual welfare conditional on enrollment in an option.

“While risk preferences impact both choices and welfare, a lack of information may be relevant for choices given a menu of options but may not impact actual welfare conditional on enrollment in an option.”

May combine two claims.

Overall, these results imply a slightly larger impact of including our additional friction measures on risk preference estimates, and, in turn, the welfare loss from additional risk exposure studied in Section V.

“Overall, these results imply a slightly larger impact of including our additional friction measures on risk preference estimates, and, in turn, the welfare loss from additional risk exposure studied in Section V.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

In this setting, if consumers take no action at the time of plan choice in 2012, they will be enrolled in the plan they chose previously as a default option.

“In our setting, if consumers take no action at the time of plan choice in 2012, they will be enrolled in the plan they chose previously as a default option.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

If confirmation bias were present, it would have to manifest on different dimensions for different consumers, which the authors believe is less likely than the case where it is present on similar dimensions across consumers.

“This suggests that if confirmation bias were present, it would have to manifest on different dimensions for different consumers, which we believe is less likely than the case where it is present on similar dimensions across consumers.”

May combine two claims.

Consumers who answer the survey can be easily classified into informed or uninformed overall, and those classified as uninformed would had to have forgotten everything they know since open enrollment.

“Thus, consumers who answer the survey can be easily classified into informed or uninformed overall, and those classified as uninformed would had to have forgotten everything they know since open enrollment.”

May combine two claims.

The analysis in the previous section provides evidence that information frictions are present for a variety of key choice dimensions and are correlated with consumers' health plan choices in a manner that implies more informed consumers are choosing plans that provide them more value.

“The analysis in the previous section provides evidence that information frictions are present for a variety of key choice dimensions and are correlated with consumers' health plan choices in a manner that implies more informed consumers are choosing plans that provide them more value.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Prior work illustrates that inertia, defined as choice persistence not resulting from stable preferences, can have a substantial impact on the choices made and consumer welfare.

“Prior work (e.g., Handel 2013 and Marzilli Ericson 2014) illustrates the inertia, defined as choice persistence not resulting from stable preferences, can have a substantial impact on the choices made and consumer welfare.”

• cites Handel 2013 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Marzilli Ericson 2014 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Taken together, the results across the estimated models reveal our friction measures both enhance choice predictions and impact risk preference estimates.

“Taken together, the results across the estimated models reveal our friction measures both enhance choice predictions and impact risk preference estimates.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The authors asked simple questions that consumers could easily understand and took a conservative stance in their main analysis on the exact structural meaning of their answers.

“we asked simple questions that consumers could easily understand and took a conservative stance in our main analysis on the exact structural meaning of their answers.”

May combine two claims.

The figure reveals substantial distributional implications of the forced switch and that incorporating additional friction measures drives a clear empirical wedge between demand and the welfare-relevant valuation of the HDHP relative to the PPO.

“The figure reveals both that there are substantial distributional implications of the forced switch (not surprising given underlying heterogeneity in health risk) and that incorporating our additional friction measures drives a clear empirical wedge between demand and the welfare-relevant valuation of the HDHP relative to the PPO.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: All information frictions are non-welfare-relevant conditional on enrollment in the HDHP.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The welfare-relevant utility (or utility conditional on enrollment) is that of a perfectly informed consumer that faces traditional uncertainty with respect to medical expenditures.

May combine two claims.

The similarity between the full model results with and without inertia suggests (i) our friction measures do an excellent job of proxying for inertia when it is excluded and (ii) that our welfare conclusions in the full model are robust to the inclusion of inertia estimates from the administrative data.

“Additionally, the similarity between the full model results with and without inertia suggests that (i) our friction measures do an excellent job of proxying for inertia when it is excluded and (ii) that our welfare conclusions in the full model are robust to the inclusion of inertia estimates from the administrative data.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Grubb and Osborne (2015) find similar behavior in cellular phone markets, where consumers also chose from menus of potentially complex nonlinear contracts.

“Grubb and Osborne (2015) find similar behavior in cellular phone markets, where consumers also chose from menus of potentially complex nonlinear contracts.”

• cites Grubb and Osborne (2015) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

A key distinction for the full model relative to the baseline models is that the inclusion of information friction measures causes a meaningful change to risk preference estimates without themselves impacting welfare conditional on enrollment.

“A key distinction for the full model relative to the baseline models is that the inclusion of information friction measures causes a meaningful change to risk preference estimates without themselves impacting welfare conditional on enrollment.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: All information frictions are non-welfare-relevant conditional on enrollment in the HDHP.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The welfare-relevant utility (or utility conditional on enrollment) is that of a perfectly informed consumer that faces traditional uncertainty with respect to medical expenditures.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The ability to directly compare the authors' results to the structural health insurance literature is a key benefit of not eliciting rich measures of consumer beliefs.

“In our analysis, the ability to directly compare our results to the structural health insurance literature is a key benefit of not taking this approach”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The sample omits people who select the sparsely chosen HMO option that the authors exclude from the analysis.

“This sample also omits people who select the sparsely chosen HMO option that we exclude from the analysis.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The counterfactual analysis studies a forced choice, or direct allocation of consumers to plans, rather than the case where consumers choose from a new menu of plans.

“It is important to note that this counterfactual analysis studies a forced choice, or direct allocation of consumers to plans, rather than the case where consumers choose from a new menu of plans.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The percentage of firms only offering HDHPs is projected to increase to 30 percent in 2015, up from 16 percent in 2014.

“The percentage of firms only offering HDHPs is projected to increase to 30 percent in 2015, up from 16 percent in 2014.”

• cites Towers Watson (2014)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The same logic extends naturally to other information frictions.

“This same logic extends naturally to other information frictions.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The analysis illustrates how an employer insurance decision or insurance regulation decision could be directly impacted when the underlying choice model includes detailed measures of information frictions and hassle costs.

“our analysis illustrates how an employer insurance decision or insurance regulation decision could be directly impacted when the underlying choice model includes detailed measures of information frictions and hassle costs.”

May combine two claims.

The change in risk preference estimates as a result of including frictions directly impacts welfare analysis and the investigation of counterfactual insurance allocation policies.

“The change in risk preference estimates as a result of including frictions directly impacts welfare analysis and the investigation of counterfactual insurance allocation policies, which we now turn to.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Barseghyan et al. (2013) use complementary approaches based on careful modeling, assumptions on the choice process, and administrative data alone.

“That paper, as well as the Barseghyan et al. (2013) paper, use complementary approaches (relative to this paper) based on the combination of careful modeling, assumptions on the choice process, and administrative data alone.”

• cites Barseghyan et al. (2013) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

From 2010 to 2014, enrollment in HDHPs increased from 15 percent to 33 percent.

“This study shows, for example, that from 2010 to 2014 enrollment in HDHPs increased from 15 percent to 33 percent.”

• cites Towers Watson (2014)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The actual question asked to employees is carefully worded so as to define what the authors refer to as time and hassle costs.

“The actual question asked to employees is presented in online Appendix A and is carefully worded so as to define what we refer to as time and hassle costs.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

Survey data should be interpreted with caution because of issues like selection bias on unobservable characteristics, confirmation bias, and consumer experiential learning and forgetting.

“those data should be interpreted with some caution because of issues like (i) selection bias on unobservable characteristics; (ii) confirmation bias; and (iii) consumer experiential learning and forgetting.”

May combine two claims.

When the firm actually switched all consumers to the HDHP in 2013, the plan premium and financial characteristics remained constant.

“when the firm actually switched all consumers to the HDHP in 2013, the plan premium and financial characteristics remained constant”

May combine two claims.

As the models incorporate information frictions and hassle costs and the mean consumer welfare loss from risk exposure due to the policy change decreases, this policy becomes more attractive and is justifiable at lower ξ.

“Thus, as the models incorporate information frictions and hassle costs and the mean consumer welfare loss from risk exposure due to the policy change decreases, this policy becomes more attractive and is justifiable at lower ξ .”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Integrating survey data with administrative data can produce valuable insights, especially when it is highly unlikely one can obtain rich enough administrative data to answer certain questions.

“we argue that integrating survey data with administrative data can produce valuable insights, especially when it is highly unlikely one can obtain rich enough administrative data to answer certain questions, as in our setting.”

May combine two claims.

The authors' estimates do not have specific implications for questions like how many plans should be offered in a market, but do have implications for what level of risk exposure regulators allow insurers to offer.

“This implies that, e.g., our estimates do not have specific implications for questions like how many plans should be offered in a market, but do have implications for, e.g., what level of risk exposure regulators allow insurers to offer.”

May combine two claims.

The results on risk preferences are robust to the underlying model of inertia; whether we include first-stage estimates or allow frictions to proxy for inertia, the implications for risk preferences, and our counterfactual welfare analysis, are similar.

“This illustrates the robustness of our results on risk preferences to the underlying model of inertia; whether we include first-stage estimates or allow frictions to proxy for inertia, the implications for risk preferences, and our counterfactual welfare analysis, are similar.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Experiential learning is not an issue for the authors if this learning occurred prior to or during the open enrollment period in 2011 since they use the survey measures as proxies for information and expectations at the time of plan choice; it can only be an issue if it occurs in between open enrollment and the survey administration.

“We note that experiential learning is not an issue for us if this learning occurred prior to or during the open enrollment period in 2011 since we use the survey measures as proxies for information and expectations at the time of plan choice: it can only be an issue if it occurs in between open enrollment and the survey administration.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) legislates the actuarial equivalence values (degrees of cost sharing) that private insurance companies can offer to consumers.

“a leading example being the Affordable Care Act (ACA) which legislates the actuarial equivalence values (degrees of cost sharing) that private insurance companies can offer to consumers (Kaiser Family Foundation 2011).”

• cites Kaiser Family Foundation 2011Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

In markets where consumers have many potential insurance choices, such as Medicare Part D or the state exchanges proposed in the ACA, the information frictions and relative plan hassle cost differences could be much larger than those documented in the authors' setting with only two primary plan options.

“In markets where consumers have many potential insurance choices, such as Medicare Part D or the state exchanges proposed in the ACA, the information frictions and relative plan hassle cost differences could be much larger than those we document in our setting with only two primary plan options.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Time and hassle costs could have tangible welfare implications once enrolled.

“On the other hand, time and hassle costs could have tangible welfare implications once enrolled.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Identification using survey data will almost always be more open to interpretation than identification using exogenous variation in administrative data.

“identification using survey data will almost always be more open to interpretation than identification using exogenous variation in administrative data.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Hastings et al. (2013) provide an example of linked survey and administrative data in the context of the economics of education.

“See, e.g., Hastings et al. (2013) for an example of linked survey and administrative data in the context of the economics of education.”

• cites Hastings et al. (2013) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

This is true broadly for other markets and other empirical questions in economics.

“This is true broadly for other markets and other empirical questions in economics.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The case where time and hassle costs are not welfare-relevant could also represent a counterfactual scenario where relative plan hassle costs are reduced to zero.

“The case where time and hassle costs are not welfare-relevant could also represent a counterfactual scenario where relative plan hassle costs are reduced to zero.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Time and hassle costs are an important friction to include in all models, but do not have a natural fit into a one dimensional type index with information frictions since they are a distinct type of friction.

“Time and hassle costs are an important friction to include in all models, but do not have a natural fit into a one dimensional type index with information frictions since they are a distinct type of friction.”

May combine two claims.

Given generally low estimates in the literature of the price elasticity of medical expenditures, it is likely such ex post responses would not have a major impact on total ex post utility, implying that lack of knowledge on financial dimensions is not likely to markedly impact ex post behavior.

“Given generally low estimates in the literature of the price elasticity of medical expenditures, it is likely such ex post responses would not have a major impact on total ex post utility, implying that lack of knowledge on financial dimensions is not likely to markedly impact ex post behavior.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The subsidy in the authors' context may be interpreted differently by consumers than if it were a premium.

“It is worth noting that the subsidy in our context may be interpreted differently by consumers than if it were a premium (see, e.g.,Kőszegi and Rabin 2006 or Kahneman and Tversky 1979) for work that illustrates this point).”

• cites Kőszegi and Rabin 2006 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Kahneman and Tversky 1979 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source