The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Dynamics of Political Compromise
Abstract
We characterize efficient self‐enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly. The party in power can decide the allocation, and the parties' political strength changes according to a Markov process. We find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power. We find that the constitutional supermajority requirements that attempt to constrain the use of power can counterproductively create less compromise.
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Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
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Cited by
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
Acemoglu, D. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.003 · Cited by 666
Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
Ligon, E., Thomas, J. P., & Worrall, T. (2002) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00204 · Cited by 653
Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government
Przeworski, A. (2010) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511778490 · Cited by 638
Przeworski, A. (2019) · doi:10.1017/9781108671019 · Cited by 599
Przeworski, A. (2005) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-005-7163-4 · Cited by 391
Metadata
- Authors
- Dixit, A., Grossman, G. M., & Gul, F.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2000-06
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 531-568
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2038922443
- Cited by
- 258
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 27.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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