The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories
Abstract
A formal model of electoral behavior is developed under the assumption that candidates have policy preferences as well as an interest in winning per se. This model is shown to have an equilibrium in a k-issue space when there are two candidates. The implications of this model are compared to the implications of the Downsian-type model where candidates are interested only in winning. Testable propositions are derived via the use of comparative statics. The results of recent studies are shown to coincide with the synthesis model but not the pure Downsian model. The theoretical model bridges the gap between formal theory and empirical research and unifies a variety of seemingly unrelated studies.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400269712 · Cited by 3,368
Cited by
Women's Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History *
Miller, G. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.3.1287 · Cited by 421
Polarization: What Everyone Needs to Know®
McCarty, N. (2019) · doi:10.1093/wentk/9780190867782.001.0001 · Cited by 280
Leech, B. L. (2010) · The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199542628.003.0028 · Cited by 91
Shufeldt, G., & Flavin, P. (2012) · State Politics & Policy Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1532440012451154 · Cited by 46
Metadata
- Authors
- Wittman, D.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1983-03
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 142-157
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2040898367
- Cited by
- 844
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 62.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1956016
- The paper
- Wittman, D. (1983). Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/1956016
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
