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Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?
Abstract
It is often claimed that there can be no such thing as a logic of scientific discovery, but only a logic of verification. By ‘logic of discovery’ is usually meant a normative theory of discovery processes. The claim that such a normative theory is impossible is shown to be incorrect; and two examples are provided of domains where formal processes of varying efficacy for discovering lawfulness can be constructed and compared. The analysis shows how one can treat operationally and formally phenomena that have usually been dismissed with fuzzy labels like ‘intuition’ and ‘creativity’.
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Citations
Cited by
Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y.-W. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211 · Cited by 2,094
Simonton, D. K. (2003) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.4.475 · Cited by 722
Bridging Practice and Theory: A Design Science Approach
Holmström, J., Ketokivi, M., & Hameri, A. (2009) · Decision Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5915.2008.00221.x · Cited by 674
From tools to theories: A heuristic of discovery in cognitive psychology.
Gigerenzer, G. (1991) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.98.2.254 · Cited by 634
Generating Theory by Abduction
Sætre, A. S., & Van de Ven, A. (2021) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2019.0233 · Cited by 608
Metadata
- Authors
- Simon, H. A.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1973-12
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 471-480
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W4250506960
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Simon, H. A. (1973). Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic? Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/288559
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.