Laws of Nature
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are expressed by singular statements of fact describing the relationship between universal properties and magnitudes.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dretske, F. I.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin System (US)
- Corresponding author
- Dretske, Fred I.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1977-06
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 248-268
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W1967194361
- Semantic Scholar
- 9bffad8880f65b7eab9dd66a36d8a58bdb1b53a3
- Cited by
- 973
- References
- 16
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 43 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 43 · 2019: 114 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 29
- FWCI
- 24.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- laws of nature, universal truth, empiricism, universal properties, magnitude, nature of law, scientific explanation
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