The nomological argument for the existence of God

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

A successful explanation must avoid two perils: providing too little structure, which predicts a universe without regularities, and providing too much structure, which precludes an explanation of certain types of lawlike regularities featured in modern scientific theories.

“A successful explanation must avoid two perils.Some explanations provide too little structure, predicting a universe without regularities.Others provide too much structure, thereby precluding an explanation of certain types of lawlike regularities featured in modern scientific theories.”

May combine two claims.

Divine Voluntarism G is better than Humeanism H, because although it may have a lower prior (P(G)<P(H)), it has a vastly higher likelihood (P(R|G)>>P(R|H)).

“Divine Voluntarism G is better than Humeanism H, because although it may have a lower prior (P(G)<P(H)), it has a vastly higher likelihood (P(R|G)>>P(R|H)).”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The hypothesis that best explains an observation is the one with the highest posterior probability.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: P(H) > P(G).

May combine two claims.

P(R|H) is extremely low, because regularities occur in only a miniscule proportion of Humean possible worlds.

“Thus, P(R|H) is extremely low, because regularities occur in only a miniscule proportion of Humean possible worlds.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The hypothesis that best explains an observation is the one with the highest posterior probability.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The objection due to Hildebrand is that Primitivism simply pushes the explanatory problem back a level.

“The objection we present is due to Hildebrand (2013), and it's based on the idea that Primitivism simply pushes the explanatory problem back a level.”

• cites Hildebrand (2013)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Predicates used in scientific descriptions of regularities are more natural than their gruesome analogues.

“We think it's evident that the predicates used in scientific descriptions of regularities are more natural than their gruesome analogues.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

More work is needed to show that non-Humean property-based theories can explain regularities.

“More work is needed to show that non-Humean propertybased theories can explain regularities.”

May combine two claims.

Primitivism entails a set of possible worlds isomorphic to that of Humeanism, and like Humeanism its ontology seems to require a uniform probability distribution over possible laws and worlds, so it confers no explanatory advantages over Humeanism.

“It entails a set of possible worlds isomorphic to that of Humeanism.And like Humeanism, its ontology seems to require a uniform probability distribution over possible laws (and thus over possible worlds), with the result that it confers no explanatory advantages over Humeanism.”

May combine two claims.

'Eternal' is a natural predicate in Lewis's sense, and 'H' and 'J' are non-natural, indeed gruesome.

“One obvious answer to give is that 'eternal' is a natural predicate in Lewis's (1983) sense, and 'H' and 'J' are non-natural, indeed, gruesome.”

• cites Lewis 1983 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Moral goods generally supervene on sentience over time, intentions over time, and preferences over time; some alleged moral goods such as fairness, desert, and equality supervene on large-scale synchronic properties.

“Moreover, moral goods generally supervene on sentience over time, intentions over time, and preferences over time, and some alleged moral goods (such as fairness, desert, and equality) supervene on large-scale synchronic properties.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

P1: God might have certain higher-order preferences, including preferences directed towards higher-order emergent properties, moral and aesthetic properties, patterns, or the content of laws themselves.

“P1: God might have certain higher-order preferences-that is, preferences directed towards higher-order emergent properties, including moral and aesthetic properties but perhaps others besides, or preferences concerning patterns or the content of laws themselves.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

A hypothetical property-based theory N* might founder on the Peril of Insufficient Structure if it allowed nomic relations of arbitrary complexity or allowed nomic relations to relate non-natural properties.

“N* might founder on the Peril of Insufficient Structure, analogously to Primitive Laws.Suppose, for example, that we allowed nomic relations of arbitrary complexity, or that we allowed nomic relations to relate non-natural properties.”

May combine two claims.

Massively disorderly worlds do not have compressions, but orderly worlds do.

“Massively disorderly worlds don't have compressions, but orderly worlds do.”

May combine two claims.

Since Humeanism doesn't offer a satisfying explanation of regularities, neither does Primitivism.

“Since Humeanism doesn't offer a satisfying explanation of regularities, neither does Primitivism.”

May combine two claims.

Property-based theories prevent attaching the 'it is a law that' operator to arbitrary sentences but also seem to prevent attaching it to sentences describing regularities.

“To their credit, they prevent us from attaching the 'it is a law that' operator to arbitrary sentences.But they seem to prevent us from attaching it to sentences describing regularities as well.”

May combine two claims.

Primitivism allows a sentence D describing particular matters of fact at a wholly disorderly world to be a statement of law, but property-based theories seem not to allow this.

“Primitivism allows D to be a statement of law, but property-based theories seem not to allow this, since there is no clear way to translate D into a statement about nomic relations between universals, fundamental dispositions, or natural kinds.”

May combine two claims.

Intelligent beings can and do have preferences directed towards higher-order emergent properties, and towards value properties in particular.

“Our point, in short, is simply that intelligent beings can and do have preferences directed towards higher-order emergent properties (and towards value properties in particular).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Divine Voluntarism appears to have less structure and more flexibility than property-based theories, since any regularity scientists could posit could be a regularity God could will.

“But it appears to have less structure-and more flexibility-than property-based theories, since it seems that any regularity that scientists could posit could be a regularity that God could will.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Divine Voluntarism has more structure than Primitivism because it countenances God's power and God's will.

“It has more structure than Primitivism, since it countenances God's power and God's will.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

A property-based theory N* that can accommodate regularities might be considerably more specific than property-based theories in general, so P(N*) might be considerably less than P(N).

“Moreover, a propertybased theory N* that can accommodate regularities might be considerably more specific than property-based theories in general, and thus P(N*) might be considerably less than P(N).”

May combine two claims.

Non-sentient beings do not value order at all; sentient beings have some preference for order and some preference for moral and aesthetic goods.

“Non-sentient beings don't value order at all.Sentient beings have some preference for order, and some preference for moral and aesthetic goods.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

P2: The vast majority of possible higher-order preferences require orderly worlds.

“P2: The vast majority of possible higher-order preferences require orderly worlds.”

May combine two claims.

Even if some property-based theory can explain regularities in modern science, Divine Voluntarism may offer a better explanation because P(R|G) > P(R|N*) or because P(G) > P(N*).

“So even if some property-based theory is capable of explaining regularities in modern science, it may be that Divine Voluntarism offers a better explanation-either because P(R|G) > P(R|N*) or because P(G) > P(N*).”

May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

Although property-based theories have explanatory power over toy patterns such as 'all Fs are Gs', they do not have explanatory power over the sophisticated sorts of regularities featured in modern science.

“In other words, although such theories have explanatory power over toy patterns such as”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

It seems reasonable that an intelligent being might care about properties of compressions.

“Further, it seems reasonable that an intelligent being might care about properties of compressions.”

May combine two claims.

Humeanism cannot explain order or regularities because its set of possible worlds has vastly more disorderly or irregular worlds than orderly or regular worlds, and its ontology seems to require a uniform probability distribution across Humean possible worlds.

“Recall that Humeanism can't explain order (or regularities, for that matter), because (i) the set of possible worlds it entails has vastly more disorderly (or irregular) worlds than orderly (or regular) worlds and (ii) the ontology seems to require a uniform probability distribution across Humean possible worlds.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Insofar as one has a higher-order preference for the aesthetic quality noisy mess, one would be indifferent among such disorderly images.

“Insofar as one has a higher-order preference for the aesthetic quality noisy mess, presumably one would be indifferent among them.”

May combine two claims.

Humeanism has just as much difficulty explaining a toy pattern like 'all Fs are Gs' as it does explaining a sophisticated regularity, and similarly for Primitivism.

“Humeanism has just as much difficulty explaining a toy pattern like”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

It is hard to conceive how conscious states could realize moral properties in highly disorderly worlds.

“Indeed, it's hard even to conceive of how conscious states could realize moral properties in highly disorderly worlds.”

May combine two claims.

We have the ability to recognize patterns, and pattern recognition seems constitutive of an important kind of thought.

“As for introspection, we find that we have the ability to recognize patterns.Indeed, pattern recognition seems to be constitutive of an important kind of thought.”

May combine two claims.

Some aesthetic properties may require consciousness; if so, everything said about moral properties applies to this subset of aesthetic properties.

“Some aesthetic properties, as with moral properties, may require consciousness.If that is so, everything said about moral properties applies to this subset of aesthetic properties.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Peril of Insufficient Structure is that the theory doesn't contain enough structure to explain the regularities we observe, or even the fact that nature is orderly.

“This is the Peril of Insufficient Structure: the theory doesn't contain enough structure to explain the regularities we observe, or even the fact that nature is orderly.”

May combine two claims.

God probably has a preference for regularity, and thus P(R|G) >> P(R|H).

“Indeed, we think they suggest that God probably does have a preference for regularity, and thus that P(R|G) >> P(R|H).”

May combine two claims.

There are extraordinarily many disorderly images that do not differ aesthetically in any interesting way; aesthetically they are lumped together.

“There are extraordinarily many such images that do not differ aesthetically in any interesting way: they just look like pure noise.Aesthetically speaking, all of them are lumped together.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

It is one thing to provide a metaphysical theory that explains toy patterns such as 'all Fs are Gs'; it is another thing entirely to provide a metaphysical theory that explains the sophisticated regularities of modern science.

“It's one thing to provide a metaphysical theory that explains toy patterns such as”

May combine two claims.

If the relevant mental states in a chessboard world are qualitatively identical to those of Michelle and Barack, then regularities have been smuggled through the back door.

“Moreover, if the relevant mental states are indeed qualitatively identical to those of Michelle and Barack, there is a sense in which regularities have just been smuggled through the back door.”

May combine two claims.

The hypothesis that God exists as creator and has the power to control whether there are patterns, including regularities, seems coherent and not much stronger or more radical than Divine Voluntarism in general.

“Moreover, the hypothesis that God exists as creator and has the power to control whether there are patterns (including regularities) seems coherent and doesn't strike us as being that much stronger and more radical than Divine Voluntarism in general.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Similarly for aesthetic properties, the Pong environment is much less beautiful than sophisticated worlds in environments with modern physics engines.

“And similarly for aesthetic properties; the Pong environment is much less beautiful than sophisticated worlds in environments with modern physics engines.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Naturalness is a necessary property.

“presumably naturalness is a necessary property (Hildebrand 2019: 165; Lewis 1986: 60-61, n. 44)”

• cites Hildebrand 2019 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Lewis 1986Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

All the intelligent beings we know of care about order, despite not all being creators.

“All the intelligent beings we know of care about order, despite not all being creators.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Physicists often treat simplicity, elegance, and beauty as properties of equations; these are legitimate intentional targets for a divine being and require the sophistication featured in the equations of modern science.

“Consider how physicists often treat simplicity, elegance, and beauty as properties of equations; these seem to be perfectly legitimate intentional targets for a divine being, and they seem to require the level of sophistication featured in the equations of modern science.”

May combine two claims.

Finite beings such as us might not be able to discern various higher-order values that disorderly worlds instantiate or allow, but we also might not be able to discern various higher-order values that orderly and regular worlds instantiate or allow.

“Yes, that's true; but we also might not be able to discern various higher-order values that orderly (and regular) worlds instantiate or allow.”

May combine two claims.

There are more possible compressions of orderly worlds than of disorderly worlds; the same is true of regular worlds.

“We argued that there are more possible compressions of orderly worlds than of disorderly worlds.The same is true of regular worlds.”

May combine two claims.

Regular worlds are compressible, so insofar as God might have preferences directed towards compressions, God is more likely than chance to have preferences for regular worlds.

“Regular worlds are compressible, so insofar as God might have preferences directed towards compressions, God is more likely than chance to have preferences for regular worlds.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Since regular worlds are highly compressible, and compressions themselves are good candidates for aesthetic properties such as elegance and beauty, the third argument complements the second argument.

“Moreover, since regular worlds are highly compressible, and the compressions themselves are good candidates for various aesthetic properties (such as elegance and beauty), this third argument nicely complements the second argument.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

For all we know, God might have further unknown reasons for preferring order or regularities that would cancel out God's possible unknown reasons for preferring disorder or mere order.

“for all we know, God might have further, unknown reasons for preferring order (or even regularities) that would cancel out God's possible unknown reasons for preferring disorder (or perhaps mere order).”

• cites Tooley 2012 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Some aesthetic properties require consciousness; if so, they require regularities as well.

“As we noted in 4.1.,some aesthetic properties require consciousness.If that's right, then our argument in 4.1 shows that these aesthetic properties require regularities as well, for reasons discussed in the paragraph above.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

In merely orderly worlds, the game must be very simple and cannot include a physics engine with any sophistication.

“The game will have to be very simple, of course.By hypothesis, it cannot include a physics engine with any sophistication.”

May combine two claims.

Divine Voluntarism can accommodate laws having the relevant sophisticated structure, and there is reason to think an intelligent being is likely to look favorably upon such laws.

“Not only can it accommodate laws having the relevant sort of sophisticated structure, there's reason to think that an intelligent being is likely to look favorably upon such laws.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

In assigning a prior probability to Divine Voluntarism, it seems appropriate to begin with its intrinsic probability.

“Therefore, in assigning a prior probability to Divine Voluntarism, it seems appropriate to begin with its intrinsic probability.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

We are not operating from a position of total ignorance.

“However, we're not operating from a position of total ignorance.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The standard view of the Monty Hall Problem holds that one is initially justified in assigning 1/3 probability to the car's being behind any particular door.

“In turn, the standard view of the Monty Hall Problem holds that one is initially justified in assigning ⅓ probability to the car's being behind any particular door.”

• cites Bradley and Fitelson (2003) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Immediate experience does not directly inform us which metaphysical theory is true.

“Immediate experience does not directly inform us which theory is true.”

May combine two claims.

Primitivists cannot explain, in the relevant sense, such regularities, but they can at least make sense of the modal force of such laws and their ability to support counterfactuals.

“We deny that Primitivists can explain (in the relevant sense) such regularities, but they can at least make sense of the modal force of such laws, their ability to support counterfactuals, etc.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Divine Voluntarism is approximately as modest and general as its main competitors at that level of explanation.

“given that (i) Divine Voluntarism is approximately as modest and general as its main competitors at that level of explanation”

May combine two claims.

Property-based accounts avoid the Peril of Insufficient Structure, but they founder on the Peril of Too Much Structure.

“Property-based accounts avoid the Peril of Insufficient Structure, but they founder on the Peril of Too Much Structure.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

There might be other evidence against Divine Voluntarism that renders the all-things-considered epistemic probability of such an explanation lower than its proponents might like, but there are no obvious candidates for such evidence.

“As noted, there might be other evidence against Divine Voluntarism that renders the all-things-considered epistemic probability of such an explanation lower than its proponents might like, but there are no obvious candidates for such evidence.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Intrinsic probabilities seem to be a good starting point for the type of metaphysical hypotheses being considered.

“The last point we want to make in favor of setting P(G) close to Pi(G) is that intrinsic probabilities seem to be a good starting point for the type of metaphysical hypotheses we are considering.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Draper admits that the minimal theses of Source Physicalism and Source Idealism have roughly equal intrinsic probability.

“Indeed, Draper (2017: 70 ff.)admits that the minimal theses of Source Physicalism (according to which everything mental is caused by something physical) and Source Idealism (according to which everything physical is caused by something mental) have roughly equal intrinsic probability.”

• cites Draper (2017: 70 ff.) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Subjectivists will also have to start with a prior confidence in some metaphysical hypothesis, and many philosophers will start with a prior confidence P(G) that is not extremely low.

“subjectivists will also have to start with a prior confidence in some metaphysical hypothesis, and many philosophers will start with a prior confidence P(G) that is not extremely low.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

For prior confidences to be objectively correct, they must be based on some objective fact, and intrinsic probabilities are such an objective fact.

“For prior confidences to be objectively correct, they must be based on some objective fact, and we hold that intrinsic probabilities are such an objective fact.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

It is objectively incorrect to begin unity-confident that the car is behind Door A, and objectively incorrect to begin 0.9-confident, and so on, but there is no reason to say it is objectively incorrect to begin 1/3-confident.

“Our quick reply is to recur to the other judgment we make: intuitively, it is objectively incorrect to begin unity-confident that the car is behind Door A, and objectively incorrect to begin 0.9-confident, and so on, but there is no reason to say it is objectively incorrect to begin ⅓-confident.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).

The standard Monty Hall view holds that if you initially select Door A, Monty opens Door B revealing a goat, and offers you the option to switch to Door C, then you should switch.

“The standard view is that if you initially select Door A, and Monty then (without yet opening Door A) opens Door B to reveal a goat, and offers you the option to switch to Door C, then you should take it.”

• cites Russell (2010: 464)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The Nomological Argument is concerned with an explanation of the fact that our world is conducive to scientific inquiry in the first place, so its question is at a level of abstraction above whether the explanation itself coheres with any specific scientific theory.

“And as for background scientific knowledge, the Nomological Argument is concerned with an explanation of the fact that our world is conducive to scientific inquiry in the first place, so our question is at a level of abstraction above whether our explanation itself coheres with any specific scientific theory.”

May combine two claims.

If the likelihood that the car is behind Door C is objectively greater after Monty opens Door B, there must be some fact about the probability distribution before any door was opened, and certain distributions must be objectively incorrect.

“If the likelihood that the car is behind Door C is to be objectively greater than it was before Monty's opening of Door B, there must be some fact of the matter about the probability-distribution before any door was opened, and certain distributions must be objectively incorrect.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Primitive and analyzable accounts of non-Humean laws have the same intrinsic probability.

“Thus, we'll suppose that primitive and analyzable accounts of non-Humean laws have the same intrinsic probability.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The sum of the probabilities of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive individual disjuncts within some proposition cannot exceed the probability of that disjunctive proposition itself.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Since the paper presents an ampliative argument, it cannot assume that it has taken into account all relevant evidence.

“Since we're presenting an ampliative argument, we cannot assume that we've taken into account all relevant evidence.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

There are various well-known objections to Primitivism, for example that its primitives are illicit and that it falls prey to van Fraassen's inference problem.

“There are various well-known objections to Primitivism-for example, that its primitives are illicit, that it falls prey to van Fraassen's (1989) inference problem, etc.”

• cites van Fraassen (1989) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

It would take a much longer work to fully defend the Nomological Argument against all possible rivals, or to show that justifying Divine Voluntarism would in turn justify classical or Anselmian theism.

“It would take a much longer work to fully defend the Nomological Argument against all possible rivals, or to show that justifying Divine Voluntarism would in turn justify classical or Anselmian theism.”

May combine two claims.

Considerations of ontological parsimony might result in a lower prior, but they are too weak to result in a significantly lower prior.

“Though considerations of ontological parsimony might result in a lower prior, they are too weak to result in a significantly lower prior.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The assignment of priors should be deeply informed by the structure of the theories.

“Our strategy is to argue that the assignment of priors should be deeply informed by the structure of the theories.”

May combine two claims.

Divine Voluntarism strikes exactly the right balance, offering enough internal metaphysical structure to avoid the Peril of Insufficient Structure, but enough flexibility to avoid the Peril of Too Much Structure.

“We think that Divine Voluntarism strikes exactly the right balance, offering”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The philosophical project of coming up with a fully systematic, uncontroversial way to assign intrinsic probabilities is difficult.

“The philosophical project of coming up with a fully systematic, uncontroversial way to assign intrinsic probabilities is difficult.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

There is a radical difference between accounts that posit a nonintentional sort of natural necessity and accounts that involve fundamental intentionality.

“In any case, there is a radical difference between accounts that posit a nonintentional sort of natural necessity (as property-based accounts do) and accounts that involve fundamental intentionality.”

May combine two claims.

Analogous objections can be raised against Divine Voluntarism, and successful replies to those objections can be adapted by proponents of Primitivism.

“However, analogous objections can be raised against Divine Voluntarism, and we think successful replies to those objections can be adapted by proponents of Primitivism.”

May combine two claims.

Nonintentional and intentional accounts of natural necessity seem equally coherent and equally modest.

“These two options thus seem equally coherent (for the same reason that the above divisions are) and equally modest; presumably only if we were already (question-beggingly) committed to naturalism or theism, etc., would we say that intentional explanations are fundamentally more or less modest.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The taxonomy's divisions group theories in a natural way, generating a classification of theories that are coherent and more-or-less equally modest.

“Do its divisions group theories in a natural way, generating a classification of theories that are coherent and more-or less equally modest?We think so.”

May combine two claims.

Primitivism avoids the Peril of Too Much Structure, but it founders on the Peril of Insufficient Structure.

“To recap, Primitivism avoids the Peril of Too Much Structure, but it founders on the Peril of Insufficient Structure.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Humeanism and non-Humeanism are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, so Pi(H v ~H) = 1.

“They are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, so Pi(H v ~H) = 1.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

If the limited being is very powerful and intelligent, the Limited Voluntarism hypothesis is so similar to Divine Voluntarism that it need not be considered carefully.

“If the”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

If the objection from materialism or dualism were decisive, it would undermine nearly all natural-theology arguments, so it does not need further attention here.

“In any case, if this objection were decisive, it would undermine nearly all natural-theology arguments, so we don't believe it needs further attention here.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

There is a massive disparity in likelihoods such as P(R|G) >> P(R|H).

“since we argued above that there is a massive disparity in likelihoods such as that P(R|G) >> P(R|H)”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Draper offers a plausible theory of intrinsic probabilities according to which they depend on the modesty and coherence of a hypothesis.

“Paul Draper (2017: 69 ff.) offers a plausible theory of intrinsic probabilities according to which they depend on the modesty and coherence of a hypothesis.”

• cites Draper (2017: 69 ff.) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Extant arguments for atheism, such as the Problem of Evil, and against other teleological arguments do not apply to Divine Voluntarism.

“and (iii) extant arguments for atheism (such as the Problem of Evil) and against other teleological arguments do not apply to Divine Voluntarism.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Principles of ontological parsimony are controversial.

“Such principles are controversial (Huemer 2009; Sober 2009; Kriegel 2013: 18 ff.; Metcalf 2016)”

• cites Huemer 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Sober 2009Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites Kriegel 2013: 18 ff.Not checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The taxonomy divisions do not feel arbitrary, but seem to result in a taxonomy of theories that displays at least rough symmetry.

“do not feel arbitrary, but seem to result in a taxonomy of theories that displays at least rough symmetry.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Bradley and Fitelson admit that they need to assume a thesis about prior or intrinsic probability anyway, namely their assumption (7).

“Indeed, Bradley and Fitelson admit (p.29) that they need to assume a thesis about prior or intrinsic probability anyway, viz.their assumption (7).”

• cites Bradley and Fitelson (2003) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Both inflationary and revisionary options appear perfectly coherent and equally modest.

“However, both options appear to be perfectly coherent, and both seem equally modest: each holds that these necessities exist; they disagree only about where the necessities come from.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

The paper's arguments constitute an important step toward a defense, so that Divine Voluntarism at least warrants attention.

“But we take our arguments to constitute an important step toward a defense, so that Divine Voluntarism at least warrants attention.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

For the most part, the taxonomy relied on exhaustive distinctions, where the options track fundamentally different ontologies.

“For the most part, we've relied on exhaustive distinctions, where the options in question track fundamentally different ontologies.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Dualism has not been convincingly shown to be vanishingly improbable.

“we don't think that dualism has been convincingly shown to be vanishingly improbable.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The paper has not argued that all minds depend for their existence on physical regularities, but instead that some immaterial minds would have reasons to create minds that do depend on physical regularities.

“More generally, we haven't argued that all minds depend for their existence on physical regularities, but instead, that some immaterial minds would have reasons (detailed in § 4) to create minds that do depend on physical regularities.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

In a state of total ignorance, we should set our prior P(G) to the intrinsic probability Pi(G).

“In a state of total ignorance, we should set our prior P(G) to the intrinsic probability Pi(G).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

One might object that theories undreamt of deserve a much larger intrinsic probability, but that approach threatens to undermine all explanatory arguments.

“One might be tempted to object that these deserve a much larger intrinsic probability, but that approach threatens to undermine all explanatory arguments.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Certain theories fall prey to the Peril of Insufficient Structure because there is no explanation of patterns among the fundamental singular facts.

“We think these theories fall prey to the Peril of Insufficient Structure, because there is no explanation of patterns among the fundamental singular facts, but that claim probably deserves its own paper.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The paper acknowledges one area in which its distinctions are not exhaustive, namely concerning theories undreamt of.

“We acknowledge one area in which our distinctions are not exhaustive-namely, concerning theories undreamt of.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The result concerning intrinsic probability will suffice to make the paper's case.

“This result concerning intrinsic probability will suffice to make our case”