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A Confutation of Convergent Realism
Abstract
This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly ‘naturalistic’ forms of scientific realism. The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle. -H. Putnam (1975)
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Citations
Cited by
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Wendt, A. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612183 · Cited by 7,664
(2007) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 7,214
Ladyman, J. (1998) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/s0039-3681(98)80129-5 · Cited by 883
Niiniluoto, I. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199251614.001.0001 · Cited by 607
Getting Real: Technoscientific Practices and the Materialization of Reality
Barad, K. (1998) · differences · doi:10.1215/10407391-10-2-87 · Cited by 601
Metadata
- Authors
- Laudan, L.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1981-03
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 19-49
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2010463828
- Cited by
- 1,555
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 55.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Confutation of Convergent Realism. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/288975
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- Laudan, L. (1981). A Confutation of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/288975
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.