The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism
Abstract
This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly ‘naturalistic’ forms of scientific realism. The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle. -H. Putnam (1975)
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Cites
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Meeting the Universe Halfway: Realism and Social Constructivism without Contradiction
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Two Views About Explicitly Teaching Nature of Science
Duschl, R. A., & Grandy, R. (2013) · Science & Education · doi:10.1007/s11191-012-9539-4 · Cited by 370
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Thinking from Things: Essays in the Philosophy of Archaeology
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The FASB's conceptual framework, financial accounting and the maintenance of the social world
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The World in the Wave Function: A Metaphysics for Quantum Physics
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Did Ptolemy make novel predictions? Launching Ptolemaic astronomy into the scientific realism debate
Carman, C., & Díez, J. (2015) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.04.002 · Cited by 26
Pragmatism, realism, and psychology: Understanding theory selection criteria
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Metadata
- Authors
- Laudan, L.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1981-03
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 19-49
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2010463828
- Cited by
- 1,555
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 55.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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