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Cited by 549

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Species

Kitcher, Philip·1984·Philosophy of Science
DOI 10.1086/289182
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Abstract

I defend a view of the species category,pluralistic realism, which is designed to do justice to the insights of many different groups of systematists. After arguing that species are sets and not individuals, I proceed to outline briefly some defects of the biological species concept. I draw the general moral that similar shortcomings arise for other popular views of the nature of species. These shortcomings arise because the legitimate interests of biology are diverse, and these diverse interests are reflected in different legitimate approaches to the classification of organisms. In the final section, I show briefly how the pluralistic approach can help to illuminate some areas of biological and philosophical dispute.

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Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Kitcher, P.
Venue
Philosophy of Science
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
1984-06
Volume
51
Issue
2
Pages
308-333
ISSN
  • 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
  • 1539-767X
DOI
10.1086/289182
OpenAlex
W4230160465
Cited by
549
References
26
FWCI
97.90
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Species. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/289182
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Kitcher, P. (1984). Species. Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/289182

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.