Representation and Explanation
Abstract
Functionalism faces a problem in accounting for the semantic powers of beliefs and other mental states. Simple causal considerations will not solve this problem, nor will any appeal to the social utility of semantic interpretations. The correct analysis of semantic representation is a teleological one, in terms of the biological purposes of mental states: whereas functionalism focuses, so to speak, only on the structure of the cognitive mechanism, the semantic perspective requires in addition that we consider the purposes of the cognitive mechanism's parts.
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Both the CSA and classical teleosemantic theories emphasise the significance of historical processes because cognitive processes are normative.
“Both approaches emphasise the significance of historical processes and both do so because of the realisation that cognitive processes are normative.”
From Traces of thinking: a stigmergic approach to 4E cognition (2025) · cites this paper as Papineau, 1984
Cites
Wright, L. (1973) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183766 · Cited by 983 · see citing works
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Traces of thinking: a stigmergic approach to 4E cognition
Sims, R. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05074-8 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“Before we do that, I want to outline briefly the differences between the CSA and classical teleosemantic theories such as those of Millikan (1984, 1989), Papineau (MacDonald and Papineau, 2006; 1984), Neander (1995, 2018), and Dretske (1981, 1988, 2006) 9 .”
- Authors
- Papineau, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Cambridge (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Papineau, David
- ORCID
- Papineau, David
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1984-12
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 550-572
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2048195825
- Cited by
- 297
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 29 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 63 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- functionalism, semantic representation, mental states, teleology, biological function, explanation, belief, cognitive mechanisms, philosophy of mind
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